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HE SPEAKS NOT, YET HE SAYS EVERYTHING; WHAT OF 
THAT?: TEXT, CONTEXT, AND PRETEXT IN STATE V. 
JEFFREY DAHMER 
GREGORY J. O’MEARA, S.J.† 
[Dahmer] drill[ed] holes in his living victims’ heads, pour[ed] in 
chemicals to “zombify” them, ha[d] sex with the corpses’ viscera, 
and ke[pt] some body parts in his refrigerator, occasionally eating 
them.1 
Of course, in some respects, Abraham does speak. He says a lot. But 
even if he says everything, he need only keep silent on one single 
thing for it to be concluded that he hasn’t spoken.2 
She speaks, yet she says nothing; what of that?3 
INTRODUCTION 
In State of Wisconsin v. Dahmer,4 the defense attempted to lead the 
jury through a series of inferences that would have them conclude the 
defendant was insane at the time he committed each of the fifteen mur-
ders charged by the State of Wisconsin. They portrayed a client who 
cooperated fully with the authorities and who was too disturbed to be 
responsible for his actions. To make this approach work, they needed 
narrative distance between Dahmer and the jury so he would not be inter-
rogated about his prior inconsistent statements and meticulous planning 
of the killings. This distance was created by Dahmer’s silence in the 
courtroom. The jury heard his words only through others’ voices. 
Though silence had worked as Dahmer’s strategy outside the courtroom, 
the weight of the evidence undermined that approach at trial. His actions 
  
 † Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. B.A., Notre Dame; J.D., Wiscon-
sin; L.L.M., New York University. When I was an Assistant District Attorney for Milwaukee Coun-
ty, I was part of the prosecution team in State v. Dahmer. Lead counsel for the prosecution was then 
Milwaukee County District Attorney E. Michael McCann, assisted by both Assistant District Attor-
ney Carol L. White and me. The defense was headed by Mr. Gerald Boyle, assisted by Ms. Wendy 
Patrikus and Ms. Ellen Ryan. The current District Attorney of Milwaukee County, John Chisolm, 
graciously gave me access to the office’s file in the Dahmer case. I am grateful to him and his assis-
tant, Ms. Sheila Stanelle, for their generosity in the preparation of this article. I am grateful also to 
Professors Edward M. Gaffney, Bruce Berner, Scott Moss, Philip Chmielewski, S.J., Daniel Blinka, 
and Paul Secunda for their help on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Mr. Bryan Bayer and 
Mr. Michael Moeschberger for their research assistance. 
 1. Stephen M. Glynn, If Dahmer’s Not Crazy, Who Is?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 9, 1992, at 13. 
 2. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE GIFT OF DEATH AND LITERATURE IN SECRET 60 (David Wills 
trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2d ed. 2008) (1999). 
 3. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. 
 4. No. 1991CF912542 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. filed July 25, 1991). 
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spoke louder than his wordlessness, and the jury spoke in finding him 
responsible for what he did.  
The job of a trial attorney is to tell a story and create a reality in the 
courtroom using the tools at hand: exhibits, testimony of witnesses, the 
rules of evidence, and the substantive law at issue in the case.5 In crafting 
this narrative, attorneys take a complex set of events and filter them into 
various causal chains which are necessarily selective and stripped-down 
representations of what occurred on some prior date or series of dates.6 
Sensitive attorneys understand that success before a jury requires appre-
hension not only of content, the “what” of the narrative, but also of style, 
the “how” of the narrative.7 This emphasis on style is critical because the 
incompleteness of information given to the jury requires it to fill gaps in 
reasoning.8 Often attorneys selectively choose which facts are presented 
to a jury because there is too much material.9 Such selectivity may also 
imply causal inferences in the jury.10 This Article maintains that, in the 
case of State of Wisconsin v. Jeffrey Dahmer, how the case was presented 
was just as important as the content of that evidence. The text of the evi-
dence needed a context; without it, the jury would not be persuaded.  
In January 1992, television cameras and newspaper reporters 
flocked to Milwaukee, Wisconsin as the case pitting the State of Wiscon-
  
 5. See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 110–11 
(2000); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND 
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 265 (1984) [hereinafter WHITE, 
CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of 
Cultural and Communal Life, in HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW 28, 34–35 (1985) [hereinafter WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW]. 
 6. See PAUL RICOEUR, MEMORY, HISTORY, FORGETTING 85 (Kathleen Blamey & David 
Pellauer trans., 2004) (“It is, more precisely, the selective function of the narrative that opens to 
manipulation the opportunity and the means of a clever strategy, consisting from the outset in a 
strategy of forgetting as much as in a strategy of remembering.”). 
 7. See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 167, 175 (discussing how rhetorical 
style can imply a range of meanings without saying any of them explicitly). 
 8. See SEYMOUR CHATMAN, STORY AND DISCOURSE: NARRATIVE STRUCTURE IN FICTION 
AND FILM 28–29 (Cornell Paperbacks 1980) (1978): 
Whether the narrative is experienced through a performance or through a text, the mem-
bers of the audience must respond with an interpretation: they cannot avoid participating 
in the transaction. They must fill in gaps with essential or likely events, traits and objects 
which for various reasons have gone unmentioned. If in one sentence we are told that 
John got dressed and in the next that he rushed to an airport ticket counter, we surmise 
that in the interval occurred a number of artistically inessential yet logically necessary 
events: grabbing his suitcase, walking from the bedroom to the living room and out the 
front door, then to his car or to the bus or to a taxi, opening the door of the car, getting in, 
and so on. The audience’s capacity to supply plausible details is virtually limitless, as is a 
geometer’s to conceive of an infinity of fractional spaces between two points. 
 9. Indeed, trial courts demand that attorneys pare down facts to avoid repetition or waste of 
time. See, e.g., Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1466 (11th Cir. 1986) (“In the normal eviden-
tiary sense cumulative evidence is excluded because it is repetitious.”); accord Int’l Minerals & 
Res., S.A. v. Pappas, 96 F.3d 586, 596 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 10. See CHATMAN, supra note 8, at 28–29. 
File: O'Meara_ToDarby.doc Created on: 11/9/2009 5:32:00 PM Last Printed: 11/12/2009 11:21:00 AM 
2009] TEXT, CONTEXT, AND PRETEXT IN STATE V. DAHMER 99 
 
sin against serial killer Jeffrey Lionel Dahmer unfolded.11 The defendant 
pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect to fifteen counts of 
first-degree intentional homicide.12 Although he admitted killing the fif-
teen victims, he maintained he should not be held responsible for those 
deaths on the ground that he suffered from a mental disease, and, because 
of this disease, he was unable to conform his actions to the requirements 
of the law.13 Essentially, Dahmer claimed he was a victim of his psycho-
logical disturbance and was no more to be blamed for his actions than 
were the young men whom he killed.  
From one perspective, the trial should have been simple. Because of 
the guilty plea, there was no need for the panoply of witnesses and phys-
ical evidence that normally attends a homicide prosecution; no need for 
coroner reports to determine cause of death; no need for specific details 
of each of the fifteen murders because the defendant conceded causing 
them. Because the affirmative defense carries the civil burden, the defen-
dant did not need to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt14 nor win 
the assent of a unanimous jury.15 Rather, the jury had only to weigh the 
testimony of detectives, acquaintances of the defendant, and expert wit-
nesses to determine the answers to two questions: at the time of each 
murder (1) “did the defendant have a mental disease or defect?” and, if 
that question were answered in the affirmative, (2) “[a]s a result of that 
mental disease or defect, did the defendant lack substantial capacity ei-
ther to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform that 
conduct to the requirements of the law?”16 Sentencing was not expected 
to be a major issue in this case—the defendant was going to be locked up 
for the rest of his life.17 The sole question for sentencing was which sort 
of institution would house him: a prison or a hospital.18  
  
 11. Duane Dudek, Dahmer’s Insanity Defense Brings Court TV Coverage, MILWAUKEE 
SENTINEL, Jan. 15, 1992, at 2 (describing how Court TV offered “gavel-to-gavel coverage” of the 
trial). 
 12. Dahmer Changes Plea to Guilty but Insane, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1992, at A19, available 
at 1992 WLNR 3335725. 
 13. Id. 
 14. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(3) (West 2009) (“Mental disease or defect excluding responsi-
bility is an affirmative defense which the defendant must establish to a reasonable certainty by the 
greater weight of the credible evidence.”). The provisions of the Wisconsin Statutes dealing with the 
defense of mental disease or defect have not substantively changed since the Dahmer case was tried. 
See, e.g., Act of May 27, 1994, 1993 Wis. Act 486, 1993 S.B. 826 (amendment to remove sexist 
language). 
 15. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.165(2) (West 2009) (“No verdict on the plea of not guilty by 
reason of mental disease or defect may be valid or received unless agreed to by at least five-sixths of 
the jurors.”). 
 16. WIS. JI–CRIMINAL § 605, at 1 (2003). The jury’s deliberation on this matter is directed by 
two questions on the verdict form. Id. at § 605B, at 1. The jury is directed “to answer the second 
question only if [they] answer the first question ‘yes.’” Id. at § 605, at 1. 
 17. Pursuant to § 971.165, the jury was instructed that Jeffrey Dahmer would not go free if 
they found him not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Rather, he would be committed to 
the custody of the state and likely be confined to a state mental hospital “unless the court determines 
that the defendant would not pose a danger to himself or herself or to others if released under condi-
tions ordered by the court.” § 971.165(2). If the jury rejected the defense of not guilty by reason of 
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However, a close examination of the evidence presented in this case 
subverts any assertion of simplicity. In every insanity case, the legal and 
mental health professions understand mental disease differently; those 
difficulties were present here as well. Further, Dahmer’s volubility and 
his penchant for documenting his actions with photographs and memen-
tos required his attorneys to walk a fine line in crafting a picture of him 
that was at once familiar enough to garner jury sympathy and odd 
enough to assure a finding that he suffered from a mental disease. While 
proclaiming a strategy of complete and open disclosure, the defense care-
fully avoided facts that might have derailed the story it attempted to con-
struct for the jury.19  
This strategy of concealment is made manifest with a simple obser-
vation: Dahmer’s guilty plea constituted the bulk of the words he said in 
open court before sentencing.20 Although Dahmer’s statements to detec-
tives and mental health professionals provided almost all the facts as-
sumed as true in the case, he was never sworn in as a witness, he never 
spoke at trial, and all of his words were mediated by others who reported 
them.21 Rather than permitting the jury to observe the flesh-and-blood 
defendant from the witness stand, the defense orchestrated his previous 
statements to fabricate the most appealing figure possible, never under-
mining this discursive image with the defendant’s live testimony. The 
strategy not only focused the jury but also controlled the defendant, 
whose earlier statements revealed inconsistencies and admissions detri-
mental to his defense.  
After a brief description of the facts, and the substance of the testi-
mony, this Article will trace the development of the insanity defense as it 
applies to the Dahmer case. I will then present challenges that confront 
any defendant who attempts to raise this argument in a criminal trial, 
coupled with challenges peculiar to defending Jeffrey Dahmer himself, 
  
mental disease or defect, then the defendant would likely be sentenced to prison; specifically, in 
Wisconsin, he would be sentenced to life imprisonment. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3) (West 
2009). Realistically, the issue at trial was not whether Jeffrey Dahmer would be locked up for life, 
but where this incarceration would take place. 
 18. See § 939.50(3); WIS. JI–CRIMINAL § 605, at 3. 
 19. This strategy of avoidance may also be attributed to the prosecution in this case. Although 
Mr. Dahmer confessed to a number of assaults in which he had sexual contact with people who were 
unconscious because he drugged them, the prosecution chose to focus solely on the murders in the 
complaint and information filed with the court. On the one hand, a number of murder charges surely 
outweigh incidental sexual crimes. On the other hand, it may be that the prosecution did not want to 
dilute the case’s clean plot line by risking the jury’s focus on the defendant’s sexual desires and 
fantasies rather than on the tragic deaths of fifteen young men. 
 20. Obviously the defendant has a guaranteed right not to testify on his own behalf. Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966). Further, the prosecution cannot comment on the defendant’s 
exercise of that right at trial. See e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617–18 (1976). I do not chal-
lenge that right. Still, from the viewpoint of trial tactics and narrative theory, one cannot pretend that 
the defendant’s choice not to take the stand is inconsequential. Part of what this Article does is show 
how far-reaching the decision to shift the defendant’s words into other mouths at trial can be. 
 21. See Rick Romell & David Doege, Boyle Says He Agonized over Dahmer Testifying, 
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb 14, 1992, at 1. 
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given his actions before and after arrest. Next, I will turn to narrative 
theory to explain how the defense presented its case, demonstrating that 
its case-in-chief restricted the flow of information to the jury and painted 
a picture of the defendant at odds with his own statements. I will then 
sketch out how the prosecution countered this image. 
I. THE VERDICT, AND THE FACTS UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED 
The trial itself lasted fewer than thirteen days from opening state-
ments to final summation. The jury’s deliberation was complete in less 
than twenty-four hours. On February 15, 1992, Judge Laurence Gram, Jr. 
received a special verdict in which the jury found that, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, Jeffrey Dahmer did not suffer from a mental dis-
ease or defect when he committed the fifteen murders to which he had 
pled guilty.22 The jury’s finding was paradoxical because most of the 
psychiatrists and psychologists who examined Dahmer thought that he 
may have suffered from some sort of mental disease.23 The verdict was 
met with cognitive dissonance both within the legal community and the 
public at large.24 On the one hand, people appreciated that Jeffrey Dah-
mer was not “given a pass,” and that he was held accountable for his 
disturbing actions which included murder, dismemberment, and canni-
balism resulting in the deaths of at least seventeen young men in Ohio 
and Wisconsin between 1978 and 1991.25 On the other hand, we feel 
uneasy with a finding that someone who kills seventeen people, collects 
the skulls and genitalia of some, eats parts of others, and drills holes in 
  
 22. Jim Stingl, Dahmer Sane: Families of Victims to Describe Their Pain at Sentencing 
Monday, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 16, 1992, at 1. Because ten of the twelve jurors found that the defen-
dant did not suffer from a mental disease, the jury did not consider the second question concerning 
the defendant’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Id.; see also WIS. JI–
CRIMINAL § 605, at 1. 
 23. As a matter of law, the jury instructions make clear: 
The term “mental disease or defect” identifies a legal standard that may not exactly 
match the medical terms used by mental health professionals. You are not bound by med-
ical labels, definitions, or conclusions as to what is or is not a mental disease or defect to 
which the witnesses may have referred. 
WIS. JI–CRIMINAL § 605, at 2. Still, even Dr. Park Elliott Dietz, one mental health witness who did 
not find that Jeffrey Dahmer suffered from a mental disease, wrote that a diagnosis of “a mixed 
personality disorder with antisocial, schizoid, and schizotypal features would be defensible.” See 
Park Elliott Dietz, Report on Mental Status of Jeffrey L. Dahmer 6 (Jan. 10, 1992) (unpublished 
court file, on file with author). 
 24. My experience indicates that most people think Jeffrey Dahmer was successful in raising 
the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. One may observe that the prosecution 
won where it counts—in court; but perhaps the defense did better than most thought in painting a 
picture of a troubled man, beset by a maelstrom of circumstances, rather than the somewhat cold and 
calculating killer that the prosecution argued was better supported by the evidence at trial. Despite 
winning the verdict, the prosecution’s case seems not to have captured the popular imagination. 
 25. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Sane Serial Killer: Experts Say Insanity Plea Alive and Well, 
Thanks Partly to Dahmer Jury, A.B.A. J., April 1992, at 22. Theresa Smith, whose brother, Edward 
W. Smith was killed by Dahmer during the summer of 1990, noted that the verdict “brought back the 
faith I lost in the justice system.” Dirk Johnson, Milwaukee Jury Says Dahmer Was Sane, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at 24, available at 1992 WLNR 3304512 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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their skulls to “zombify” them is sane.26 As one commentator asked, “If 
Dahmer’s not crazy, who is?”27 
Beginning with the death of Steven Tuomi in late 1987 and continu-
ing until his arrest in July 1991, Jeffrey Dahmer refined his modus ope-
randi for murdering men susceptible to his entreaties.28 Dahmer would 
charm and seduce attractive young men, inviting them to come home 
with him and promising to pay them to pose for erotic photographs or to 
watch videos.29 The victims were mostly in their twenties, and none of 
them drove a car.30 After taking a cab or bus to a spot that was a few 
blocks from his residence,31 Dahmer would walk to his dwelling with the 
victims, invite them in, and eventually offer them a drink laced with Hal-
cion, a sleep aid for which Dahmer had a prescription.32 Once the victims 
were unconscious, Dahmer would have sex with them, and then he 
would strangle them before they awoke.33 Dahmer would often fondle 
their dead bodies and masturbate, and eventually he would move their 
bodies either to a drain spout or into a bathtub where he would cut them 
  
 26. Glynn, supra note 1, at 13. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Initially, Dahmer claimed all of his victims were gay or bisexual. Dennis Murphy, State-
ment of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 15 (July 23, 1991) (unpublished police report, on file 
with author). (“He stated the reason that he killed these homosexuals and he stated they all were 
homosexuals, was because he wanted to be with them.”). Later, he admitted that a number of his 
victims were not gay but came home with him to be videotaped upon his promising them payment. 
Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 23–25 (Nov. 13, 1991) (un-
published report, on file with author). 
 29. Dennis Murphy & Patrick Kennedy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 
88 (July 31, 1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author): 
As far as the sexual preference and/or race, religion, or education of the individuals that 
the suspect preferred, the suspect stated it was not a matter of race, religion, or education, 
it was just a matter of opportunity. He stated he offered each one of the individuals mon-
ey to be photographed, to view videos, or to have sex, and after he persuaded them to 
come into his apartment, he would give them a sleeping potion, namely Halcion, and 
once they went to sleep, he would strangle them either manually or with a strap, photo-
graph most of them after death, sometimes have sex with them after death, and then sub-
sequently dismember them and on approximately eleven of the victims, kept the skulls 
and approximately four torsos, the hands, a couple hearts, and other inner organs. 
 30. Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 59 (Jan. 10, 1992) 
(unpublished report, on file with author). 
 31. Murphy & Kennedy, supra note 29, at 81: 
He stated the reason why he would have the taxi drop him off several blocks from his 
apartment was in order to keep the taxi driver from knowing exactly where he lived at 
and to see if anyone had been following him, as he did not want anyone to detect his ac-
tivities. 
 32. Dennis Murphy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 149–50 (Aug. 22, 
1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author): 
We then asked if he was experiencing any withdrawals, not only from alcohol but from 
not using halcion. He related that he has not experienced any withdrawals from alcohol 
nor from the use of halcion, because he does not take the pills regularly. He related that 
he would take one pill about every six months and that was only when he could not sleep. 
He related that the main reason he had halcion was to use [it] on the people he brought to 
his apartment or the ones he met in the bathhouses. He related that he first started to ex-
periment by using three pills on the people and then used as many as seven on some of 
them. He related that he would bluff the doctors into prescribing the pills for him because 
he would tell them that he could not sleep but never used them. 
 33. Murphy & Kennedy, supra note 29, at 88. 
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up to dispose of them, occasionally saving trophies such as their skulls or 
preserved genitalia.34 On four occasions he engaged in cannibalism but 
later stated he found this unfulfilling.35 He would either burn or throw 
out their clothing and destroy any identification they had on them.36 
When Dahmer was arrested, there were remains of eleven of his victims 
in his apartment.37 
In addition to these facts recounted by the defendant to police detec-
tives, additional claims emerged from Dahmer’s discussions with clini-
cians. Dahmer reported he attempted to exhume a freshly dead corpse for 
sexual purposes,38 he drank blood from a test tube while working as a 
phlebotomist,39 and he drilled small holes into the skulls of five of his 
victims while they were drugged and injected a mixture of muriatic acid 
and water, or boiling water alone, in an attempt to make them sexual 
slaves.40 He also claimed that he planned to build a “‘temple’ that fea-
  
 34. Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 37 (Dec. 20, 1991); 
Patrick Kennedy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 123 (July 23, 1991) (unpub-
lished police report, on file with author). 
 35. Murphy, supra note 32, at 151–52: 
Jeff Dahmer went on to relate that he had originally told us that he had only eaten a bicep 
of one of his victims. He related that there were other times in which he had eaten part of 
the victim. The first time was the person he identified as Cash D (Raymond Smith—
Victim #5). He related that he eat [sic] this victim’s heart. He related that it tasted kind of 
spongy. He indicated that the next victim was the person he met by the bookstore, (Vic-
tim #7—Ernest Miller). He related that this was a person he really liked. He indicated 
that he had filleted his heart and had kept it in the freezer and also kept his bicep. He in-
dicated that he had eaten the thigh muscle of this subject, but it was so tough he could 
hardly chew it. He then purchased a meat tenderizer and used it on the bicep. He stated 
that it tasted like beef or a filet mignon. The next person he was going to eat, and in fact 
tried, was victim # 15—Oliver Lacy. He stated that on this victim he ate his bicep. This 
also tasted like Filet mignon. He stated that he would tenderize it first. He stated that he 
did keep this individual’s heart and bicep. We asked him if he had eaten the body parts, 
just plain. He stated that he would use salt, pepper, and A–1 Steak sauce on them. He 
stated that the reason he ate these parts was because he was curious but then it was be-
cause he wanted to make them a part of him. He stated that this way he could keep these 
people with him. He stated that he ate only the people that he really liked and wanted 
them to be a part of him or with him all the time. 
See also Dietz, supra note 23, at 4 (“He had no enduring interest in cannibalism, but rather tried it 
out of curiosity and made use of the occasion to masturbate to fantasies of a victim he had con-
sumed. Although he did so on as many as 10 occasions, this did not develop into an enduring or 
intense sexual interest.”). 
 36. R.W. Munsey, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 12, at 195 (July 26, 1991) 
(unpublished police report, on file with author) (“Jeffrey L. Dahmer stated he took the victim’s 
clothing to a location used to burn trash by his father where there he burned the clothing and identi-
fication.”) (describing Dahmer’s destruction of evidence following the Hicks homicide in Bath, 
Ohio). 
 37. See Jeffrey Jentzen et al., Destructive Hostility: The Jeffrey Dahmer Case: A Psychiatric 
and Forensic Study of a Serial Killer, 15 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. PATHOLOGY 283, 292 (1994). 
 38. Dietz, supra note 23, at 3. 
 39. Id. at 4. 
 40. Fosdal, supra note 28, at 26–27: 
“I was trying to think of a way to not have to kill them.” . . . Said he would drill a small 
hole through the top of the skull and into the brain—on about four or five victims—used 
a baster . . . [and] injected diluted muriatic acid into the skull. . . . Said drilling the hole in 
the skull was “an experiment—it never worked out.” Tried this technique on his last 4–5 
victims—put acid into the hole on four of the victims and boiling water in one of the vic-
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tured his victims’ remains in hopes of ‘receiving special powers and 
energies.’”41 
II. THE UNDERLYING ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
The above facts surely signal someone who is seriously disturbed. 
Indeed, if one asked someone on the street whether a person who did 
these things were crazy, the answer would be a resounding “yes.”42 This 
recognition gains significance in light of two seemingly contradictory 
positions held by the law. On the one hand, the criminal law prides itself 
on being a system that concerns itself with justice rather than ven-
geance.43 Judgments are not determined by categories used by persons in 
ordinary discourse; the law calls for analytical distinctions developed 
throughout the course of its history.44 On the other hand, juries determine 
if a defendant raises the insanity defense successfully, and the courts’ 
instructions advise the panel that it may disregard expert witnesses’ opi-
nions and draw its own conclusion as to the mental state of the defen-
dant.45 These instructions invite jury members to give weight to their 
own reasoning and conclusions, even when those conclusions deviate 
from the conclusions of those recognized as experts in the field of mental 
health.46 Because it grants jurors the authority to disregard expert opi-
nions, the court must control precisely what information it permits the 
jury to consider. The insanity defense rests upon the Aristotelian assump-
tion about all human beings that underlies the criminal justice system; 
specifically, the law presumes that human beings are rational and make 
free and unconstrained choices in this world.47 Aristotle maintained that 
  
tims. Said the five individuals did not get into a “zombie” state. . . . The purpose was that 
they would be alive, the bodies would be preserved, but their personality would be “zom-
bie—so I wouldn’t have to go out looking for partners.” 
 41. David Doege, Dahmer Planned Shrine of Bones, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1992, at 
1. 
 42. See GEORGES CANGUILHEM, THE NORMAL AND THE PATHOLOGICAL 117 (Carolyn R. 
Fawcett trans., Zone Books 1989) (1966) (“When we call another man insane, we do so intuitively 
‘as men, not as specialists.’ The madman is ‘out of his mind’ not so much in relation to other men as 
to life: he is not so much deviant as different.”).  
 43. See PAUL RICOEUR, CRITIQUE AND CONVICTION 117 (Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., Kath-
leen Blamey trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1998) (1995) (“[J]ustice encounters its contrary first in the 
thirst for vengeance, which is a powerful passion: justice consists in not seeking vengeance. Between 
the crime and the punishment, to return to well-known categories, lies justice and, consequently, the 
introduction of a third party.”). 
 44. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 99 (1986) (discussing precedent and legislation in 
the conception of state power). 
 45. WIS. JI–CRIMINAL § 605, at 2 (2003) (“You are not bound by medical labels, definitions, 
or conclusions as to what is or is not a mental disease . . . .”). In an explanatory footnote to this 
instruction, the Jury Instructions Committee explains: 
The intent of this sentence is to emphasize that the jury is not bound by what is consi-
dered “mental disease or defect” for medical purposes. The jury is bound by the legal de-
finition of mental disease as explained in this instruction. In a proper case, the judge may 
wish to emphasize this distinction. 
Id. at 7 n.7. 
 46. See id. at 2, 7 n.7. 
 47. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 65 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs–Merrill Educ. 
Publ’g 1962): 
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the origin of our actions is internal, within ourselves, and thus voluntary: 
“[I]f we cannot trace back our actions to starting points other than those 
within ourselves, then all actions in which the initiative lies in ourselves 
are in our power and are voluntary actions.”48 Professor George Fletcher 
shows how this notion of the rational human being acting voluntarily is 
often formulated in terms of “free will.”49 Criminal law presumes free 
will operates in all situations unless we recognize extenuating circums-
tances giving rise to an excuse or justification.50 
Despite the admonition that the law is addressed solely to rational 
actors choosing freely among alternative courses of action, the law has 
not always recognized an actor’s rationality.51 Rather, the law’s early 
focus was solely on consequences of the physical act itself. In early Eng-
lish law, if there were a quarrel and a dead body resulted, then the killer, 
regardless of reasons for doing so, was liable to punishment.52 As com-
mon law was influenced by canon (church) law following the Norman 
Conquest, matters began to change; canonists assigned weight not only 
to the act itself but also to the intention that lay behind it.53 By determin-
ing a penitent’s intention, the confessor could assign an appropriate pen-
  
For where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act, and where we can 
say “no,” we can also say “yes.” Therefore, if we have the power to act where it is noble 
to act, we also have the power not to act where not to act is base . . . . But if we have the 
power to act nobly or basely, and likewise the power not to act, and if such action or inac-
tion constitutes our being good and evil, we must conclude that it depends on us whether 
we are decent or worthless individuals. 
See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, 
AND INTERNATIONAL 9–10 (2007) (discussing the history of Aristotle’s view of involuntary actions 
by reason of mistake, duress, or insanity). 
 48. ARISTOTLE, supra note 47, at 65. 
 49. FLETCHER, supra note 47, at 10 (“This problem of attributing agency has traditionally 
been addressed under the label of ‘free will.’ In the Christian West, the discussion of free will took 
the place of Aristotle’s focus on the issue of voluntary action.”). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND 
THE LAW ON TRIAL 30 (1988): 
From roughly the 13th to the 16th century, the plea of self-defense, called se defendendo, 
came into consideration whenever a fight broke out and one party retreated as far as he 
could before resorting to defensive force. His back had to be literally against the wall. 
 
If he then killed the aggressor, se defendendo had the effect of saving the defendant 
from execution, but it left intact the other stigmatizing effects of the criminal law. The 
defendant forfeited his goods as expiation for having taken human life. The murder wea-
pon was also forfeited to the Crown as a deodand, a tainted object. Killing se defendendo 
was called excusable homicide, for though the wrong of homicide had occurred, the cir-
cumstances generated a personal excuse that saved the manslayer from execution. 
 52. See id. 
 53. JOHN MAHONEY, THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE ROMAN 
CATHOLIC TRADITION 180 (1987). At least Aquinas considered both the act and the intention in 
determining the moral goodness of an action. His perspective was a corrective on the work of Peter 
Abelard which focused solely on the intention with which an act was done. Mahoney notes: 
[I]n his ethics Abelard was equally individualistic, to the extent of concentrating the mo-
rality of good or bad action not in what was being done, but in the intention with which it 
was done. . . . Moral goodness or badness does not reside in any action considered in it-
self but derives only from the intention which produces the action. 
Id. at 176. 
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ance in the confessional.54 Professor Fletcher maintains that the criminal 
law was influenced by these pastoral attempts at grading the intention 
behind an act.55 For example, distinctions in self-defense can be traced 
back to distinctions made by canonists56: 
The modern approach to the distinction between self-defense and 
punishment finds its best exposition in the work of Thomas Aquinas, 
who emphasizes the intention with which the defender harms the ag-
gressor. If the intention is not to harm but merely to fend off the at-
tack, then the action can properly be described as an act of self-
defense; but if the intention is to make the aggressor suffer for his 
misdeed, then the act appears to be closer to punishment. . . . The ba-
sic principle is that a private individual may not intentionally kill 
another human being when the explicit object (rather than the side ef-
fect) of the action is to cause death.57 
Because the criminal law lacks ministers to interrogate the offender 
with the breadth and depth granted to the confessor,58 it modified the 
canonist’s approach to intent or motive. Rather than focusing on a psy-
chological reality underlying a given act, criminal law constructs an ele-
ment called the actor’s “intent.” The best definition of intent in criminal 
law arises in the work of the nineteenth-century jurist James Fitzjames 
Stephen: “The only possible way of discovering a man’s intention is by 
looking at what he actually did, . . . what must have appeared to him at 
the time the natural consequence of his conduct.”59 The understanding of 
a defendant’s intent is not an inquiry into the actual motives that stirred 
the defendant to action or deep desires of the heart; rather, it is an act of 
reconstruction based on the defendant’s external actions.60 The law looks 
at what an actor did and reasons backwards, presuming that the rational 
actor intended the ensuing consequences.61 
By considering the actor’s intent, the law went beyond its earlier 
consideration of external acts and focused on the actor’s point of view. 
This concentration on the subject’s motivation gave rise to two broad 
categories of defenses: justifications and excuses.62 These defenses in 
  
 54. See id. at 179–80. 
 55. FLETCHER, supra note 47, at 14. (“[W]hat one intends specifies moral actions, not what 
one does not intend, since the latter result is accidental. . . . And so such acts of self-defense by them 
to preserve one’s life, do not have the character of being unlawful” (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica)). 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 58. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 58–73 (Robert Hurley trans., Pan-
theon Books 1978) (1976). 
 59. See 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 111 
(1883). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Of course other defenses are possible, for example, those rooted in a failure to fulfill the 
elements of the crime or claims that the crime, as written, violates constitutional protections. Be-
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turn imply the presence of an event conveyed to the jury by means of 
narrative.63 They provide a context, a world that is subject to limitations, 
in which the defendant lives and in which he makes rational choices.64  
III. JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
Justifications take the following form: “When viewed in its entirety, 
the defendant’s act was neither wrong nor bad; indeed, the act was vir-
tuous.”65 An act such as the use of defensive force to repel an aggressor’s 
unlawful attack is an example of a justified action. We say that the actor 
is justified because we find self-defense or defense of others understand-
able, rational, and worthy of commendation.66 
Excuse in criminal law is different. The law excuses criminal de-
fendants from penal consequences for wrongful acts arising either 
through no fault of their own or in situations where the law perceives that 
the defendant was subject to a “maelstrom of circumstance.”67 Excuse is 
rooted in the sense that “what the actor did was wrong, but she had a 
good reason for doing it.”68 
Excuses in criminal law stem from reasons either external or inter-
nal to the actor. Duress is one example of an external force resulting in 
an excuse.69 Assume defendant D shoots an innocent victim V, causing 
bodily injury to her. Normally this action should result in a charge of 
  
cause this paper considers issues of defect in a defendant’s intent, I am focusing on justification and 
excuse because these defenses are addressed particularly to the mens rea element. 
 63. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983): 
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it 
and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scrip-
ture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes 
not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live. 
(footnote omitted). 
 64. Id. 
 65. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978): 
Claims of justification concede that the definition of the offense is satisfied, but challenge 
whether the act is wrongful; claims of excuse concede that the act is wrongful, but seek to 
avoid the attribution of the act to the actor. A justification speaks to the rightness of the 
act; an excuse, to whether the actor is accountable for a concededly wrongful act. 
 66. To label a defense as a justification rather than an excuse is already to accept a set of 
values subject to the vagaries of history. As alluded to above, the common law did not view as self-
evident that killing another in self-defense freed the actor from punishment. See ARISTOTLE, supra 
note 47, at 65. The underlying command “Thou shalt not kill” would have been seen as outweighing 
an assumption that self-preservation is an unmitigated good. Only when moral weight is given to 
preservation of life as a good in itself can the act of defensive force be seen as justified. It may be 
that the intuitive “rightness” that characterizes a particular defense as a justification rather than an 
excuse is as much a product of social mores as anything else. 
 67. FLETCHER, supra note 65, at 808: 
Excuses are motivated by compassion for persons caught in a maelstrom of circumstance. 
The underlying sentiment is that if any one of us were forced to act at gunpoint or to steal 
in order to survive, we would do the same. If we recognize our essential equality with the 
accused and identify with his situation, then we cannot help but feel compassion and 
excuse his all-too-human transgression. 
 68. See id. at 802–03. 
 69. See, e.g., id. at 829–33. 
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battery. However, when D pulls the trigger and shoots V solely because 
actor A has a revolver cocked and pointed at D’s temple, threatening to 
kill him if he fails to fire the gun, the law may excuse D’s action. A’s 
training a gun on D impeded D’s ability to choose, and therefore, shoot-
ing the gun at V was not the product of D’s will. To put the matter diffe-
rently, D does not evince a criminal character by acting as he does, and 
his act may therefore be excused.  
Excuses also arise from internal forces understood as burdening an 
actor’s freedom of choice just as much as a gun held to his temple. Con-
sider the excuse rationale underlying the mistaken use of defensive force. 
Imagine defendant E reasonably believes that her life is threatened by 
actor F. Assume further that E believes her failure to take immediate 
action to thwart this deadly attack will result in her death. Assume finally 
that E’s belief is mistaken; she is not under attack at all. E’s act of vi-
olence directed at F injures an innocent person. In this situation, the law 
may excuse E’s action because, had the circumstances been as E reason-
ably believed them to be at the time of her act, E’s actions would have 
been justified.  
Excuse defenses uphold the anthropology of the rational actor be-
cause actors who are excused when under duress or mistaken about sur-
rounding facts still act rationally.70 They choose among alternatives after 
weighing options they perceive, even if their assumptions are later dis-
proved. The plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect 
likewise upholds the anthropology of the rational actor in criminal law 
because it excuses defendants who are unable to act rationally in a given 
situation through no fault of their own.71 That said, the insanity defense 
remains filled with difficulties and seeming contradictions.72   
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL EXCUSE OF INSANITY  
A. Vicious Wills and Reason 
The first English lawyer to consider the mental element of the crime 
and propose relief for the insane was Henri de Bracton in his thirteenth 
century treatise On the Law and Customs of England.73 He maintained 
  
 70. Id. at 802–03. 
 71. Id. at 835: 
The definition, administration and ramifications of the insanity defense express the deep-
est concerns of the Anglo-American legal culture. . . . In posing the question whether a 
particular person is responsible for a criminal act, we are forced to resolve our doubts 
about whether anyone is ever responsible for criminal conduct. And if some are responsi-
ble and some are not, how do we distinguish between them? 
 72. See id. 
 73. De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae was completed around 1256; it is credited as “the 
first systematic treatise on English.” Anthony Michael Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins and 
Development of the “Wild Beast” Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation to Theories of Criminal 
Responsibility, 1 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCI. 355, 356 (1965); see also JOEL PETER EIGEN, WITNESSING 
INSANITY: MADNESS AND MAD-DOCTORS IN THE ENGLISH COURT 35 (1995): 
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that one needs a “will to harm” before a crime can be committed.74 
Drawing on canon law, Bracton noted that, just as the law does not hold 
infants or brute beasts responsible for the consequences of their behavior, 
there are some adults who should likewise be excused because their 
ability to reason is impaired, and they are thus comparable to children or 
“brutes.”75 
The focus on the will noted by Bracton was underscored later by 
Blackstone: “So that to constitute a crime against human laws, there must 
be, first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon 
such vicious will.”76 Although he agreed with Bracton on the necessity of 
the will in making legal determinations, Blackstone reframed the issue in 
terms of cognitive impairment.77 Whereas Bracton excuses the insane 
whom lack “corrupt intent,” “will to harm,” and “malice,” Blackstone 
addressed the actor’s inability to reason because, presumably, reason 
informs the will: 
[I]f there be any doubt, whether the party be compos or not, this shall 
be tried by a jury. And if he be so found, a total idiocy, or absolute 
insanity, excuses from the guilt, and of course from the punishment, 
of any criminal action committed under such deprivation of the 
senses; but, if a lunatic hath lucid intervals of understanding, he shall 
answer for what he does in those intervals, as if he had no deficien-
cy.78 
According to Blackstone, a defendant may be relieved of responsi-
bility not only when he manifests a wholly deficient reason but also at 
sporadic points when his reason seems impaired.79 Further, during times 
when his reason seems unaffected, a defendant should be held responsi-
ble for what he does.80 
B. Reason and the M’Naghten Standard 
This recognition that partial impairment may support a defense of 
insanity occurs in the case of Daniel M’Naghten.81 Here the test for in-
sanity shifts from the defendant’s volitional impairment to his cognitive 
  
Bracton . . . was the first English lawyer (he was also chancellor of Exeter Cathedral and 
chief justiciary of the highest court in the realm) to incorporate the mental element into 
legal writing: “For a crime is not committed unless the will to harm be present . . . In 
misdeeds we look to the will and not the outcome.” In essence, the law conceived of 
people as capable of free choice, a free exercise of the will. 
(alteration in original). 
 74. EIGEN, supra note 73, at 35. 
 75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *21. 
 77. See id. at *25. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). M’Naghten was a politically celebrated case. 
See EIGEN, supra note 73, at 153. 
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processes. M’Naghten shot Edward Drummond who eventually died 
from the wound.82 M’Naghten was charged with murder and pleaded not 
guilty by reason of insanity.83 The case presented difficulties because 
M’Naghten fit into neither of the two categories described by Black-
stone. He was neither a “lunatic” nor someone who seemed insane with 
occasional lucid intervals.84 Rather, M’Naghten appeared otherwise sane 
and lucid except when dwelling upon a particular delusion that he was 
the victim of political persecution.85 The physician Edward Thomas Mu-
nro testified in the trial court that this condition should be sufficient to 
relieve the defendant of responsibility: 
[A] person may have a morbid delusion, and yet still know that thiev-
ing is a crime, or that murder is a crime, but his antecedent delusions 
lead to one particular offense or another . . . [I] think that delusion of 
this nature [political persecution] carries a man quite away—I mean 
that his mind was so absorbed in the contemplation of the fancied 
persecution, that he did not distinguish between right and wrong.86 
In its recitation of the facts, the high court agreed as it observed: 
[I]t was of the nature of the disease with which the prisoner was af-
fected, to go on gradually until it had reached a climax, when it burst 
forth with irresistible intensity: that a man might go on for years 
quietly, though at the same time under its influence, but would all at 
once break out into the most extravagant and violent paroxysms.87 
M’Naghten’s case perplexed the Queen’s Bench because his custo-
mary appearance of sanity raised the possibility of the defendant’s ly-
ing.88 The original jury returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
  
 82. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718. Drummond was the prime minister’s secretary; most 
people think M’Naghten mistook Drummond for Prime Minister Peel, a fact which cuts both for and 
against his sanity. Id. See ROGER SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN 
VICTORIAN TRIALS 124–25 (1981) (discussing the development of the M’Naghten rules in light of 
competing professional claims by medicine and law). 
 83. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718. 
 84. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *25. 
 85. See EIGEN, supra note 73, at 153–54 (citing Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Case 874, 5th 
Sess. 756–59 (1842-43). 
 86. Id. at 153 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Old Bailey 
Sessions Papers, Case 874, 5th Sess. 756–59 (1842–43)). 
 87. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718. 
 88. In recognizing this possibility, the court touched upon a widely-held belief that still infects 
the public perception of the criminal justice system. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CRONIN, FORENSIC 
PSYCHOLOGY 93 (2006): 
When asked, most students will estimate that the insanity plea is used anywhere from 25 
to 50 percent of the time in criminal cases. Additionally, the public also feels that it is 
generally successful as a way to avoid incarceration. One study found that the public 
thought that the insanity plea was used as a ploy in nearly 50 percent of all criminal cases 
and that it was successful 20 percent of the time. Actually, the plea of not guilty by rea-
son of insanity is used in less than 1 percent to 3% of all criminal cases. . . . It also has a 
much lower success rate than most people believe. Several studies have found that the 
plea is successful . . . approximately 25 percent of the time. . . . Approximately 70 percent 
of the insanity acquittals are the result of a plea bargain or similar arrangements rather 
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sanity.89 This decision was appealed to the House of Lords, which, after 
debating the matter, referred the case for declaratory judgment to the 
High Court.90  
The published decision consists of two opinions.91 In the initial opi-
nion, Mr. Justice Maule ruled that the insanity defense is available when 
there is proof of the unsoundness of mind “such as render[s] [a defen-
dant] incapable of knowing right from wrong.”92 Lord Chief Justice Tin-
dal, writing for the majority, took Maule’s idea and developed it at great-
er length. Tindal noted that the law presumed every defendant’s sanity; 
therefore, the defense had the burden of proving to the jury’s satisfaction 
that a party was “labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of 
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; 
or, if he did know it, that he did not, know he was doing what was 
wrong.”93 
The rule makes two distinctions. In the first instance, one fails “to 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing” insofar as the actor 
is so deluded that he truly believes he is performing one action when he 
is doing something wholly other.94 Tindal also proposed a separate cate-
gory of defendants who should not be held responsible: those who knew 
what they were doing but did not know that it was wrong.95 Furthermore, 
Tindal indicated that the mere presence of a delusion in the mind of the 
defendant is insufficient to grant the defense.96 Rather, Tindal directed 
trial courts to consider the nature of the delusion and how it affects the 
actions of the defendant.97 A defendant may only be excused if, were his 
delusion correct, he would have had an excuse under the law, such as 
that granted by a reasonable mistake of fact.98 
The development of the law from Blackstone to M’Naghten paral-
lels the emergence of psychiatry as a profession.99 Psychiatric experts 
changed the quality of evidence sufficient for excusing criminal liability 
on the grounds of insanity.100 Previously, the finding of insanity rested 
  
than through a jury trial. This is not too surprising in light of the fact that juries tend to 
hold negative attitudes toward the insanity defense. 
(citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
 89. M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 718–19. 
 90. Id. at 719. 
 91. See id. at 719, 721. 
 92. Id. at 720. 
 93. Id. at 721. 
 94. Id. See generally OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT (Touch-
stone 1998) (1985) (describing victims of neurological disorders so profound that they simply cannot 
distinguish among various objects and actions). 
 95. See M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 721. 
 96. See id. at 721. 
 97. See id. at 722. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See e.g., SMITH, supra note 82, at 90–91. 
 100. See ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
CRIMINAL LAW 173 (Robert Stevens et al. eds., 1993): 
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upon the ordinary observations of lay people.101 After the rise of psy-
chiatrists (or alienists, as they were called) in the nineteenth century, the 
finding of insanity became problematic; mental illness was no longer 
something seen by ordinary people. Rather, mental illness referred to 
something more occult, internal, and observable only by those with spe-
cial training.102 
C. Reason, Mental Illness, and the Products Test  
The M’Naghten rule seized the legal imagination and became the 
test to determine criminal insanity not only in England but also in the 
vast majority of United States jurisdictions. In 1972, the American Law 
Institute’s Model Penal Code revised and added to the M’Naghten test, 
which resulted in “the ALI test”.103 The ALI test continues the cognitive 
element of the M’Naghten rule104 and adds a volitional element, which 
  
The concept of insanity appears to fit neatly into an orthodox liberal framework. The in-
sane person is morally, therefore legally, irresponsible for his acts, and unpunishable. At 
most, the criticism might be that the law’s outmoded narrowness stems from a judicial 
over-sensitivity to the needs of social protection which should be corrected by reform in 
favour of the accused. But what cannot be recognised from this perspective is how the 
traditional views about insanity are ideologically entrenched within legal discourse, so 
that much more rides on the issue than a small measure of enlightened liberal reform. At 
stake is a particular way of seeing the social world and the human beings that populate it 
that is both powerful, and odd. 
(citation omitted). 
 101. The ordinary observations of lay people still constitute valid evidence of a defendant’s 
responsibility when he pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. See Duthey v. State, 111 N.W. 222, 
225–26 (Wis. 1907). Relying on Duthey, the prosecution in the Dahmer case repeatedly asked ordi-
nary lay people about their observations of Jeffrey Dahmer and if they thought he was mentally ill 
on the basis of their experience. 
 102. See, e.g., NORRIE, supra note 100, at 176: 
Insanity came increasingly to be seen as a product of disease located in the brain which 
caused the mad behaviour. Following their methodology to its natural conclusion, psy-
chiatrists then argued that the ‘truth’ of insanity lay not in its empirical manifestation, in 
conduct displaying an obvious lack of reason, but in the underlying causal mechanisms to 
be found in the brain. 
 
It was this move in thinking that caused the break with law. If the ultimate locus of in-
sanity was not in its psychological manifestation but in underlying organic causes, it be-
came possible to conceive of forms of insanity which left the ‘surface’ areas of the 
psyche, for example the reasoning faculty, relatively unaffected while attacking the ‘dee-
per’ elements of the will or the emotions. A lack of reason became one, but only one, 
symptom of an underlying, causal, mental illness. A man could as a result appear quite ra-
tional but still be insane. . . . A man might know that he was doing wrong but be unable 
to stop himself (volitional insanity), or believe that he was not bound by the normal rules 
of society (emotional insanity). 
 103. SMITH, supra note 82, at 19. 
 104. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect 
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” (alteration in original)). 
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was first introduced in Parsons v. State105 and then famously adopted and 
developed by Judge David Bazelon in Durham v. United States.106 
The Durham decision reversed the criminal conviction of Monte 
Durham, finding the trial court erred in holding that the defendant failed 
to raise sufficient proof to consider the insanity defense.107 The court 
rejected the M’Naghten test and adopted a volitional approach that un-
derscored the defendant’s ability to choose to act in some way other than 
the way he did.108 The proposed test read: “[A]n accused is not criminal-
ly responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or 
mental defect.”109 There are two key elements in this test: the first is the 
soft definition of mental disease; the second is the hard determinism of 
the “products” test. 
1. Soft Definition of Mental Disease 
The Durham court made no attempt to define “mental disease” save 
that it addressed a condition that was capable of change in a way that a 
mental defect would not be.110 The distinction did not prove helpful ei-
ther to the courts or to psychiatrists called to testify because 
“[p]sychiatrists and some judges believed it established medicine’s right 
to provide categories for classifying criminal deeds.”111 The lack of clari-
ty is underscored by the historical event where psychiatrists redefined the 
term.112 Immediately following the Durham decision, court-appointed 
psychiatric witnesses limited the definition of “mental disease” in insani-
ty pleas to cases of psychosis because that was the standard for involun-
tary civil commitments at that time.113 After a few years with this ap-
proach, mental health professionals changed the working definition of 
“mental disease” with no input from the courts. Professor Becker ex-
plains: 
[I]n 1957 . . . the staff of Saint Elizabeths Hospital decided to change 
its policy. Nonpsychotic diagnoses—particularly, the diagnosis of 
“sociopathic personality disturbance”—would now be explicitly rec-
orded . . .[as] a “mental disease.” . . .  
  
 105. 2 So. 854, 859 (Ala. 1887). I am grateful to Professor Bruce G. Berner of Valparaiso 
University School of Law for calling my attention to the original decision in which the volitional test 
emerged. 
 106. 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
 107. Id. at 868–69. 
 108. Id. at 874–75. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. SMITH, supra note 82, at 19. 
 112. See generally Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Durham Revisited: Psychiatry and the Problem of 
Crime (pt. 2), PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS, Sept. 1973, at 12 (1973). 
 113. Id. at 15. 
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The change of policy at Saint Elizabeths had not been made as a 
result of any new psychological insights.114 
This seemingly capricious shift undermined medical authority in the 
courts; suddenly the accepted standard changed, and none of the in-
volved parties could explain why.115 
2. Hard Determinism of the Products Test 
The difficulty rooted in the nebulous definition of mental disease 
was compounded by its pairing with a fuzzy notion of causation in Dur-
ham’s “products test.” After rejecting the M’Naghten test as inadequate, 
the court held that “an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlaw-
ful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.”116 This test 
drew battle lines between lawyers committed to free will and psychiatr-
ists who adopted a more determinist line. Psychiatrists preferred the 
Durham products test to M’Naghten’s line of authority. Professor Norrie 
observes: 
[T]hese tests . . . permitted a direct ‘scientific’ account of the ac-
cused’s conduct to be delivered in cause and effect terms in the cour-
troom, unencumbered by old-fashioned and ultimately metaphysical 
tests of responsibility. Durham addressed the underlying causes of 
mentally disordered crime rather than dealing with what might only 
be certain symptoms of a disorder. It dealt concretely with the disor-
dered subjectivity of the accused, and therefore was from the psy-
chiatrists’ viewpoint more just and understanding.117 
In contrast to the shifting views of psychiatrists, lawyers and judges 
in the criminal justice system clung to the “old-fashioned . . . tests of 
responsibility.”118 Criminal lawyers labored daily to determine responsi-
bility. Attorneys and judges wondered if the approach of psychiatry was 
at cross purposes with what they understood as the criminal law’s prima-
ry function: assigning responsibility119: 
For lawyers, however, Durham represented a threat to the very no-
tion of individual justice according to law. First, it took the decision 
out of the hands of both the law and the jury by making the question 
  
 114. Id. at 16. Professor Becker notes later that psychiatrists proposed this shift because their 
previous interpretation of the term seemed a far too restrictive definition of mental disease. Id. at 16. 
Becker sees this shift as a salutary maneuver because it permitted the psychiatrists to testify to other 
conditions which they had previously neglected to consider under the rubric of “mental disease,” 
leading to more acquittals. Id. at 16–17. That said, the example described underscores the flimsiness 
of the definition and may add support to the legal profession’s mistrust of forensic psychiatry. See id. 
at 17. 
 115. See e.g., Alan A. Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 33 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 636, 637 (1982). 
 116. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
 117. NORRIE, supra note 100, at 183–84. 
 118. Id. at 184. 
 119. Id. 
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of insanity a matter for psychiatry alone. The law was side-lined and 
the jury left with no real decision on the accused’s responsibility. . . .  
The psychiatrists’ scientific operating assumption of a universal 
determinism threatened to engulf the law’s assumptions of free will 
and responsibility. . . . Scientific determinism was not a theory about 
insanity: it was a general theory about human conduct. Psychiatry 
threatened the liberal conception of the responsible subject.120 
D. The Law in Dahmer 
Wisconsin adopted the ALI test that combines both cognitive ele-
ments from the M’Naghten test and the volitional stress from Durham: 
[A defendant] is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect the person lacked 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or 
her conduct or conform his or her conduct to the requirements of 
law.121 
In Wisconsin, a defendant must establish this affirmative defense to 
a reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence.122 
Whether the defendant has met this burden of proof is a question of fact 
for the jury.123 Of course, different jurisdictions may assign burdens of 
proof for affirmative defenses in different ways, but that consideration is 
beyond the scope of this paper’s concerns. 
V. CHALLENGES FACED BY THE DAHMER DEFENSE 
A. The Challenge of Proving Insanity in General 
As indicated above, criminal law assumes that punishment is appro-
priate only where a person can be blamed for his actions. For this reason, 
the law maintains that unless one’s actions were the product of choice, 
we do not find guilt as a matter of law.124 Because mental disease or de-
fect can profoundly affect one’s capacity to exercise rational choice, it 
seems that a defense ought be given in cases where a defendant’s medi-
cal condition prevents its exercise.125 But establishing that a medical or 
psychiatric condition exists can prove an elusive challenge. As the late 
  
 120. Id. (citation omitted). 
 121. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1) (West 2009). 
 122. Id. § 971.15(3). 
 123. See State v. Leach, 370 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Wis. 1985). 
 124. For example, courts have found that involuntary behavior due to psychomotor epilepsy 
may provide a defense to criminal liability. People v. Grant, 360 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1977). 
 125. John J. McGrath, The Insanity Defense: A Difficult Necessity, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 54, 54–55 (1985): 
[T]he sane should be judged and sentenced, but the insane are proven to be ill and thus 
should be treated. It is crucial to distinguish between sanity and insanity during both 
judgment and disposition. . . . A return to Bedlam cannot be risked simply because our 
science finds the definition and demonstration of insanity difficult and elusive. 
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Professor Georges Canguilhem of the Sorbonne pointed out, mental dis-
ease, and therefore the insanity defense, is often difficult to determine.126 
His student Michel Foucault observed:  
[I]t is only by an artifice of language that the same meaning can be 
attributed to “illnesses of the body” and “illnesses of the mind.” A 
unitary pathology using the same methods and concepts in the psy-
chological and physiological domains is now purely mythical . . . .127 
Psychiatric illnesses do not always have organic origins, and me-
thods used in diagnosing and treating physical illnesses do not have clear 
parallels in psychiatry.128 Conversely, it is also difficult to describe with 
precision what makes up a “normal” range of rational choice.129 Thus, 
psychiatry lacks a clear standard to enunciate when a person ought to be 
held liable for their choices.130 This apparent confusion stems from the 
uncertain organic basis for psychiatric maladies.131 The causal factors 
linking body, mind, and behavior are still poorly understood.132 The mat-
ter is further clouded by our positivist and empiricist bias, which largely 
holds that something does not exist unless it can be measured.133 Mental 
and emotional problems are frequently not subject to empirical valida-
  
 126. CANGUILHEM, supra note 42, at 117: 
Minkowski also thinks that the fact of insanity cannot be reduced to just the one fact of 
disease, determined by its reference to one image or precise idea of the average or normal 
[human] being. When we call another man insane, we do so intuitively “as men, not as 
specialists.” The madman is “out of his mind” not so much in relation to other men as to 
life: he is not so much deviant as different. 
 127. MICHEL FOUCAULT, MENTAL ILLNESS AND PSYCHOLOGY 10 (Alan Sheridan trans., Univ. 
of Cal. Press 2d ed. 2008) (1954). 
 128. Id. at 10–11: 
[P]sychology has never been able to offer psychiatry what physiology gave to medicine: 
a tool of analysis that, in delimiting the disorder, makes it possible to envisage the func-
tional relationship of this damage to the personality as a whole. The coherence of a psy-
chological life seems, in effect, to be assured in some way other than the cohesion of an 
organism . . . . One cannot, then, make abstractions in the same way in psychology and in 
physiology, and the delimitation of a pathological disorder requires different methods in 
organic and in mental pathology. 
 129. See CANGUILHEM, supra note 42, at 119: 
In the final analysis it is the patients who most often decide—and from very different 
points of view—whether they are no longer normal or whether they have returned to 
normality. For a man whose future is almost always imagined starting from past expe-
rience, becoming normal again means taking up an interrupted activity . . . . 
 130. See Stone, supra note 115, at 640. 
 131. FOUCAULT, supra note 127, at 10–13. 
 132. CANGUILHEM, supra note 42, at 118 (noting how “somatic disease is capable of a superior 
empirical precision, of a better-defined standardization” than is mental disease). 
 133. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a 
Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1997) (noting how certain forms of 
economic analysis presume that all things can be measured and compared): 
A commitment to the commensurability of all an agent’s ends runs very deep in the Law 
and Economics movement. Even when a plurality of distinct ends is initially recognized, 
the underlying view that agents are “maximizers of satisfactions,” and that satisfaction is 
something that varies in degree rather than in kind, leads the theorist rapidly back to the 
idea that distinctions among options should be understood in terms of the quantity of util-
ity they afford, rather than in terms of any basic qualitative differences. 
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tion, and psychiatrists observe that it is impossible to say if a patient is 
cured.134  
The uncertain etiology of mental illness is often seen by jurists and 
the public as undermining the criminal justice system when it is invoked 
as the basis for excusing behavior.135 Reflecting on the French expe-
rience, Foucault notes, “The essential issue therefore was to ascertain the 
reality and degree of the madness in question. The deeper the insanity, 
the more innocent the subject’s will.”136 The public seems to believe that 
the insanity defense is successfully employed by large numbers of crimi-
nals who thereby avoid punishment.137 Further, psychiatrists are mi-
strusted because they contradict each other on the stand.138 Professor 
Alan Stone observed that the trial of John Hinckley, Jr., in which the 
defendant was acquitted because the prosecution failed to disprove men-
tal illness beyond a reasonable doubt, “was a bleak experience for Amer-
ican psychiatry, and the verdict shook public confidence in the American 
criminal justice system.”139 
The above considerations underscore how the law and the public at 
large misperceive how psychiatrists can and do contribute to the legal 
enterprise. Initially, the prevailing clinical understanding of mental 
health issues is not easily translated into conclusions that can be of use in 
a courtroom.140 This confusion in definition emerges in part because psy-
chiatrists and attorneys have vastly different objectives when they in-
quire into psychiatric pathology. Clinical study of the mind is a therapeu-
tic discipline. Psychiatrists and psychologists attempt to heal the suffer-
ing of those beset by mental and emotional distress. By contrast, lawyers 
focus on questions of blame and responsibility; they strive to divide 
those who have the ability to choose freely from those who cannot.141 In 
cases raising the insanity defense, therefore, the questions to be grappled 
with at trial, though familiar ground for attorneys, are concerns far re-
  
 134. Stone, supra note 115, at 640 (“Psychiatrists treat mental illness, often with great benefit 
to very sick patients, but that is not the same as curing them. . . . We can treat people and return them 
to the community. They will function better, but we cannot guarantee that they are cured . . . .”). 
 135. CRONIN, supra note 88, at 93. 
 136. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF MADNESS 137 (Jean Khalfa ed., Routledge trans., 2006) 
(1961). 
 137. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 115, at 637, where Professor Stone summarizes a lengthy 
statement by Hon. John Ashbrook of Ohio recorded in the 1981 Congressional Record. 
 138. Id. 
 139. ALAN STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 77 (1984). John Hinckley, Jr. at-
tempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1981. He was found not guilty by reason of 
insanity. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Hinckley Hails “Historical” Shooting to Win Love, N.Y. TIMES, July 
9, 1982, at A10, available at 1982 WLNR 315512. 
 140. CRONIN, supra note 88, at 90: 
The definition of insanity is a legal term, not a mental health term, and the defendant 
must meet the legal definition of being insane. The exact definition of insanity varies by 
jurisdiction. . . . Not everyone who suffers from a mental illness is judged by the courts to 
be insane. Indeed, many individuals who suffer from a psychosis and commit a crime do 
not meet the legal criteria for insanity. 
 141. See Stone, supra note 115, at 640. 
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moved from those of psychiatrists.142 As a result, psychiatrists must be 
guarded in their testimony, and commentators worry that not all are.143 
Not all challenges go against the defense; evidentiary rulings in in-
sanity cases may cut both ways. Ordinarily, criminal cases are marked by 
strict limitations on admissible testimony. In the first instance, the evi-
dence is restricted by the crime that has been charged.144 The jury is di-
rected to determine facts at a particular point in time.145 Evidence of oth-
er actions or events is limited either by constitutional claims146 or on the 
grounds of relevance.147 Insanity trials broaden the frame of relevance; as 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted, “no evidence should be ex-
cluded which reasonably tends to show the mental condition of the de-
fendant at the time of the offense.”148 By pleading insanity, the defendant 
directs the jury to a question more amorphous than determining specific 
facts at a given point in time. Professor Wigmore is clear in his discus-
sion of insanity pleas under common law: “Any and all conduct of the 
  
 142. See Insanity Def. Work Group, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, American Psychiatric Association 
Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 686 (1983): 
The American Psychiatric Association is not opposed to legislatures restricting psychia-
tric testimony . . . . We adopt this position because it is clear that psychiatrists are experts 
in medicine, not the law. As such, the psychiatrist’s first obligation and expertise in the 
courtroom is to “do psychiatry,” i.e., to present medical information and opinion about 
the defendant’s mental state and motivation and to explain in detail the reason for his 
medical–psychiatric conclusions. When, however, “ultimate issue” questions are formu-
lated by the law and put to the expert witness . . . then the expert witness is required to 
make a leap in logic. He no longer addresses himself to medical concepts but instead 
must infer or intuit what is in fact unspeakable, namely, the probable relationship be-
tween medical concepts and legal or moral constructs such as free will. 
 143. STONE, supra note 139, at 96: 
Psychiatry is held hostage by the psychiatrists who testify in courts whatever their stan-
dards and whatever the test of insanity may be. They undertake an enterprise which has 
hazards for us all. The reputation and credibility of our profession is in their hands. And 
if I am correct . . . they know not what they are doing. 
 144. FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by 
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed 
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissi-
ble.”). If the evidence proposed does not make a fact in consequence as determined by the substan-
tive law more or less likely, it is not relevant. FED. R. EVID. 401. Therefore, courts streamline trials 
by excluding matters that do not bear directly on the case at hand, even limiting relevant evidence in 
some situations. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 145. RICOEUR, supra note 6, at 318: 
Past acts are . . . represented solely in terms of the nature of the charges selected prior to 
the actual trial. They are represented in the present within the horizon of the future social 
effect of the verdict that will decide the case. The relation to time is particularly notewor-
thy here: representation in the present consists in a staging . . . and a measured discourse 
of conscious legitimation . . . . 
 146. For example, under the Fifth Amendment, “No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Relying in part on this provi-
sion, the U.S. Supreme Court held that defendants have a right to be informed of their rights to an 
attorney and to decline answering questions when subject to custodial interrogation. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 147. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.”). 
 148. State v. Carlson, 93 N.W.2d 354, 361 (Wis. 1958). 
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person is admissible in evidence” as the jury attempts to determine if a 
defendant should be held accountable for his actions.149 As Professor 
Goldstein observes: 
The almost unvarying policy of the courts has been to admit any evi-
dence of aberrational behavior so long as it is probative of the defen-
dant’s mental condition . . . . Indeed, virtually never does one see any 
attempt to restrict the sort of lay evidence which is a staple of the in-
sanity defense—that the defendant wept, or that he was given to vio-
lent rages, or that he threatened to throw his child out the window.150 
By expanding the range of admissible evidence, the defendant 
pleading insanity has greater resources to mine than does the ordinary 
criminal defendant.151 That said, when the defendant pleads guilty, the 
prosecution likewise can broaden the scope of the evidence it uses. Thus, 
the defense must be wary when entering a plea that throws open the 
doors to evidence ordinarily barred at trial. 
B. Challenges Specific to the Dahmer Defense 
The argument that anyone sexually attracted to corpses must have a 
mental disease seems self-evident, but that assertion faced specific diffi-
culties in this case, both psychiatric and narrative. From the psychiatric 
perspective, no less an authority than Sigmund Freud doubted the claim 
that necrophiliacs suffer from a mental disease: 
Nevertheless, in some of these perversions the quality of the new 
sexual aim is of a kind to demand special examination. Certain of 
them are so far removed from the normal in their content that we 
cannot avoid pronouncing them ‘pathological’. This is especially so 
where (as, for instance, in cases of . . . intercourse with dead bodies) 
the sexual instinct goes to astonishing lengths in successfully overrid-
ing the resistances of shame, disgust, horror or pain. But even in such 
cases we should not be too ready to assume that people who act in 
this way will necessarily turn out to be insane or subject to grave ab-
normalities of other kinds.152 
Freud was quoted neither by the prosecution nor the defense in the 
Dahmer case, but his reluctance to find disease in such cases directly 
undermines the theory of the defense by observing that necrophiliacs can 
“override” resistances to their sexual acts and remain sane.153 
Freud’s objection points more generally to a logical flaw in the de-
fense’s strategy. The defense used circular logic to argue: (1) Jeffrey 
  
 149. 2 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 228 (1979). 
 150. ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 54 (1967). 
 151. Id. 
 152. SIGMUND FREUD, The Sexual Aberrations, in THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF 
SEXUALITY 1, 27 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1962). 
 153. Id. 
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Dahmer’s sexual predilections were so disturbing that no sane person 
could share them, and (2) even if they could share them, they would not 
act on them; therefore, (3) because Dahmer had these urges and acted on 
them repeatedly, proves he could not control his actions. Therefore, he is 
insane, and his actions should be excused. When examined carefully, the 
position implies a wide range of disturbing conclusions. Change the facts 
a little. Assume rather that the defendant is sexually aroused only when 
he engages in acts of violent rape. Consistent with this deviation, he lures 
unsuspecting victims back to his apartment where he rapes them brutally. 
In his defense, he claims that he cannot control these urges; they are the 
only way he can achieve sexual satisfaction. Such a stimulus for sexual 
arousal is in many ways as distasteful as Dahmer’s desires, but I doubt 
that most people share an intuition that the law should excuse the expres-
sion of violent rape fantasies. Merely because Dahmer had an unusual set 
of sexual triggers does not mean that he was less able to control himself 
than anyone else.154 Indeed, Dahmer himself did not seem to subscribe to 
the “uncontrollable desire” argument: 
I have one person to blame—the person sitting across from you—no 
one else—no one put a gun to my head—I had choices to make and I 
made the wrong choices[.] I could have made different choices in the 
past[.] [I]t’s obvious to me[.] If I had more foresight[,] if I had more 
motivation to find a career and worthwhile acts to fill my time—
rather than drinking my problems away[.] I drank my emotions and 
problems away.155 
The narrative difficulties faced by the defense are less direct and 
more complex. Initially, Dahmer laid out his actions in an extraordinarily 
detailed set of interviews with detectives and experts investigating the 
case. His statement to the Milwaukee Police Department alone fills over 
145 typewritten pages.156 Normally the defense controls the flow of in-
formation from the defendant; that was not the case here. Dahmer repeat-
edly asked to speak with officers, usually when his attorneys were 
present, but he sometimes insisted on speaking without counsel.157 This 
  
 154. See id. 
 155. Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 9 (Oct. 16, 1991) 
(unpublished report, on file with author). 
 156. See Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5 (unpublished police report, on file 
with author). Based on my experience as an assistant district attorney, this statement differs not only 
in quantity but also in kind. Before this case, I am hard pressed to recall a statement longer than 
perhaps ten typewritten pages. It is as though the psychic floodwaters came pouring out of the de-
fendant once his dam of silence had been breached. In this way, it resembles the extensive narrative 
described with characteristic insight by Michel Foucault who saw the confession of the murderer 
Rivière and the dossier it engendered as expressing the battle among emerging professions trying to 
assert their power in evolving industrial society. This particular strand of thought is unfortunately 
beyond the scope of this paper. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, I, PIERRE RIVIERE, HAVING 
SLAUGHTERED MY MOTHER, MY SISTER, AND MY BROTHER . . . : A CASE OF PARRICIDE IN THE 
19TH CENTURY (Michel Foucault ed., Frank Jellinek trans., Pantheon Books 1975) (1973). 
 157. See, e.g., Dennis Murphy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 47–48 
(July 27, 1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author): 
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extensive confession hampered his attorneys’ ability to craft a defense 
because they could not proffer any argument that conflicted with Dah-
mer’s self-reported narrative.  
A further difficulty in the case arose from its particularly gruesome 
facts, not only as reported by the defendant but also as photographed and 
collected by him.158 On the one hand, the spoken and visual evidence 
could strengthen the argument that the defendant was mentally unhinged. 
On the other hand, the defense attorneys needed to weigh proffering evi-
dence that could alienate the jury and risk a verdict based on disgust. 
Further, because of the physical evidence, the attorneys could not simply 
claim that Dahmer was delusional and made everything up. The physical 
evidence tied him ineluctably to facts reported. The defense therefore 
elected to clothe the evidence in a veneer of respectability by enveloping 
it in the testimony of clinicians. Concrete details of the murders and the 
disposal of the evidence were broadly “psychologized” so that the jury 
would focus on the predicament of a young man haunted by his unortho-
dox sexual urges, rather than looking at his bloodstained hands. 
VI. MEETING THE CHALLENGES: NARRATIVE THEORY AND TRIAL 
COURTS 
Trial attorneys are essentially storytellers, historians of brief mo-
ments in time who attempt to direct their audience to certain conclusions 
and not others.159 Stories and historical accounts are usually enclosed in 
texts, a fixed set of symbols that mediate meaning from the author to the 
reader.160 Although the trial court’s decision in Dahmer was never ap-
pealed, and although no transcript was ever prepared, what occurred in 
  
I asked Mr. Dahmer if he had anything else to tell me, and why he did not request to have 
his attorney prior to talking to me, and he stated that he did not want his attorney there he 
just wanted to tell me about this other thing that he had forgotten and he didn’t need his 
attorney present for that. I asked if he felt he needed the attorney for any other question-
ing, and he stated he felt he did not because he has been truthful with me the whole time 
and he does not feel he needs his attorney present when I’m there. I again informed him 
of his attorney’s request, that he contact the attorney prior to contacting me, and he stated 
he understands and if he feels he has something important enough to tell me he will call 
me. I then informed him again that his attorney had requested his cooperation, and he 
stated he would consider it. 
 158. The court ordered sealed a set of Polaroid photos taken by the defendant after sentencing. 
I don’t believe anyone has examined them since the trial. 
 159. See, e.g., AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 110. See generally WHITE, 
CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing the narrative nature of codi-
fied law); JAMES BOYD WHITE, Telling Stories in the Law and in Ordinary Life: The Oresteia and 
“Noon Wine,” in HERACLES’ BOW, supra note 5, at 168 (demonstrating the legal process as a story 
development and narrative method). 
 160. PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, 
ACTION AND INTERPRETATION 174 (John B. Thomson ed. & trans., 1981): 
[I]n the asymmetrical relation between the text and the reader, one of the partners speaks 
for both. Bringing a text to language is always something other than hearing someone and 
listening to his speech. . . . For the text is an autonomous space of meaning which is no 
longer animated by the intention of its author; the autonomy of the text, deprived of this 
essential support, hands writing over to the sole interpretation of the reader. 
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the trial court can helpfully be understood as a text.161 With attorneys in 
the authorial role and the jury cast as readers, witnesses spoke in front of 
the jurors but did not interact with them.162 Jurors were not free to ask 
questions or to ask for clarification; rather, they were asked to apply the 
facts, as they found them, to the law.163 
At a slightly different level of abstraction, the jury was asked to 
construct a master narrative, a world, a context for the evidence that 
emerged at trial and that somehow made sense of it.164 The defense pre-
sented a series of events following in sequence that urged the jury to 
conclude that, because Jeffrey Dahmer’s desires and actions were so 
bizarre, he must have been suffering from a mental disease. By contrast, 
the prosecution attempted to contextualize Dahmer’s claimed madness 
by drawing a picture of Dahmer the man.165 Ultimately, the members of 
  
 161. I use the term “text” here broadly. Legal scholars are used to referring to textual analysis 
at the appellate level. This makes perfect sense. Through printed texts and oral argument, appellate 
lawyers appeal to the rational and the propositional. By contrast, trial attorneys convey meaning 
through a much more diverse set of signifiers. In addition to being wordsmiths, trial attorneys need 
to employ the craft of a stage director or camera operator. Trial attorneys appreciate that juries will 
be moved by logic, but they also understand that reason is tutored by emotion. A bloodstained shirt, 
a wedding photo of the victim, or a weapon actually used in a murder adds little to the propositions 
that make up steps in a chain of reasons. However, these mute objects may speak eloquently of the 
ebb and flow of a homicide victim’s life, the terror of witnesses, and the burden of sorrow carried by 
family members. 
 162. RICOEUR, supra note 160, at 146–47: 
It does not suffice to say that reading is a dialogue with the author through his work, for 
the relation of the reader to the book is of a completely different nature. Dialogue is an 
exchange of questions and answers; there is no exchange of this sort between the writer 
and the reader. The writer does not respond to the reader. . . . [Reading] thereby replaces 
the relation of dialogue, which directly connects the voice of one to the hearing of the 
other. 
 163. See PAUL RICOEUR, THE JUST 121 (David Pellauer trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) 
(1995): 
The application of a rule is in fact a very complex operation where the interpretation of 
the facts and the interpretation of the norm mutually condition each other, before ending 
in the qualification by which it is said that some allegedly criminal behavior falls under 
such and such a norm which is said to have been violated. If we begin with the interpreta-
tion of the facts, we cannot overemphasize the multitude of ways a set of interconnected 
facts can be considered and, let us say, recounted. . . . We never finish untangling the 
lines of the personal story of an accused with certainty, and even reading it in such a way 
is already oriented by the presumption that such an interconnectedness places the case 
under some rule. To say that a is a case of B is already to decide that the juridical syllog-
ism holds for it. 
 164. RICOEUR, supra note 160, at 178: 
What we make our own, what we appropriate for ourselves, is not an alien experience or 
a distant intention, but the horizon of a world towards which a work directs itself. The 
appropriation of the reference is no longer modelled on the fusion of consciousnesses, on 
empathy or sympathy. The emergence of the sense and reference of a text in language is 
the coming to language of a world and not the recognition of another person. 
 165. Id. at 278: 
[I]t must be said that any narrative combines, in varying proportions, two dimensions: a 
chronological dimension and a non-chronological dimension. The first may be called the 
‘episodic dimension’ of the narrative. Within the art of following a story, this dimension 
is expressed in the expectation of contingencies which affect the story’s development; 
hence it gives rise to questions such as: and so? and then? what happened next? . . . . But 
the activity of narrating does not consist simply in adding episodes to one another; it also 
constructs meaningful totalities out of scattered events. This aspect of the art of narrating 
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the jury had to reconcile these two approaches in terms of the law they 
were given. They had to decide which narrative, if either, corresponded 
with what they understood as the truth.166 
As Paul Ricouer observes in his work on nonfiction narratives, his-
torical truth as expressed in texts is always a constructed entity; even if it 
does not correspond with the historical events it purports to describe, it 
may well supplant the event itself in the community’s imagination.167 
Historians understand this distinction as a matter of course. Professor 
Tzvetan Todorov observes: 
The work of the historian, like every work on the past, never consists 
solely in establishing the facts but also in choosing certain among 
them as being more salient and more significant than others, then 
placing them in relation to one another . . . .168 
Just as the historian chooses among salient facts, attorneys select 
what evidence to put before the jury.169 Thus, it matters greatly what evi-
dence is brought before the jury, for that testimony is the only basis whe-
reby the jury can construct its sense of “what really occurred.”170 Of 
  
is reflected, on the side of following a story, in the attempt to ‘grasp together’ successive 
events. The art of narrating, as well as the corresponding art of following a story, there-
fore require that we are able to extract a configuration from a succession. 
 166. RICOEUR, supra note 6, at 178–79: 
A vigilant epistemology will guard here against the illusion of believing that what we call 
a fact coincides with what really happened, or with the living memory of eyewitnesses, as 
if the facts lay sleeping in the documents until the historians extracted them. This illusion 
. . . for a long time underlay the conviction that the historical fact does not differ funda-
mentally from the empirical fact in the experimental natural sciences. . . . [W]e need to 
resist this initial confusion between a historical fact and a really remembered event. The 
fact is not the event, itself given to the conscious life of a witness, but the contents of a 
statement meant to represent it. . . . So understood, the fact can be said to be constructed 
through the procedure that disengages it from a series of documents concerning which we 
may say in return that they establish it. This reciprocity between construction (through a 
complex documentary procedure) and the establishing of a fact (on the basis of the doc-
ument) expresses the specific epistemological status of the historical fact. It is this propo-
sitional character of the historical fact (in the sense of “fact that . . .”) that governs the 
mode of truth or falsity attached to the fact. The terms “true” and “false” can legitimately 
be taken at this level in the Popperian sense of “refutable” and “verifiable.” 
(third omission in original). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TZVETAN TODOROV, LES ABUS DE 
LA MÉMOIRE 50 (1995). 
 169. Id. at 318: 
Past acts are . . . represented solely in terms of the nature of the charges selected prior to 
the actual trial. They are represented in the present within the horizon of the future social 
effect of the verdict that will decide the case. The relation to time is particularly notewor-
thy here: representation in the present consists in a staging, a theatricalization . . . . This 
living presence of the scenes replayed solely on the plane of discourse comes under the 
heading of visibility, which was shown . . . to be related to the expressibility . . . on the 
plane of the literary representation of the past. 
 170. CHATMAN, supra note 8, at 45–46: 
[T]he interesting thing is that our minds inveterately seek structure, and they will provide 
it if necessary. Unless otherwise instructed, readers will tend to assume that even “The 
king died and the queen died” presents a causal link, that the king’s death has something 
to do with the queen’s. We do so in the same spirit in which we seek coherence in the 
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course, the jury’s reconstruction, based on its limited information, may 
differ greatly from the historical event itself.171 Despite this variance 
from the historical event, in our system of justice, the jury’s verdict is the 
version of history that matters. Thus, the defense crafted an object of 
discourse, of words, to supplant the flesh and blood reality of Jeffrey 
Dahmer, leading the jury to focus on only parts of his story to persuade 
them to adopt a version of events at odds with the broader historical 
narrative. They did this by creating two claims of consistency that subli-
mated Dahmer’s normality and attempted to hide his guilt. 
The substance or subject matter of a narrative, or trial, cannot be se-
parated from its medium, how the story is told, and who tells the jury 
what it hears.172 In Dahmer’s case in chief, the jury saw his life primarily 
through the lens of detectives, clinical psychologists, and psychiatrists. 
This narrative distance conferred a respectability upon the content which 
would have been absent had Dahmer been testifying on his own be-
half.173 If Dahmer were to recount the same events from the witness 
stand, the jurors would naturally regard his testimony as self-serving and 
discount its possible truthfulness.174 By contrast, when that same testi-
  
visual field, that is, we are inherently disposed to turn raw sensation into perception. So 
one may argue that pure “chronicle” is difficult to achieve. “The king died and then the 
queen died” and “The king died and then the queen died of grief” differ narratively only 
in degrees of explicitness at the surface level; at the deeper structural level the causal 
element is present in both. The reader “understands” or supplies it; he infers that the 
king’s death is the cause of the queen’s. “Because” is inferred through ordinary presump-
tions about the world, including the purposive character of speech. 
 171. RICOEUR, supra note 6, at 179: 
What is one talking about when one says that something happened? . . . [I]t is to preserve 
this status of the reference of historical discourse that I distinguish the fact as “something 
said,” the “what” of historical discourse, from the event as “what one talks about,” the 
“subject of . . .” that makes up historical discourse. In this regard, that assertion of a his-
torical fact indicates the distance between the said (the thing said) and the intended refer-
ence, which according to one of Benveniste’s expressions turns discourse back toward 
the world. The world, in history, is past human life as it happened. . . . [What is said is 
known as] “standing for” . . . . To get there, we need to leave underdetermined the ques-
tion of the actual relation between fact and event, and tolerate a certain indiscrimination 
in the employment by the best historians of these terms as standing for each other. 
 172. Id. at 163–64: 
The specificity of testimony consists in the fact that the assertion of reality is inseparable 
from its being paired with the self-designation of the testifying subject. The typical for-
mation of testimony proceeds from this pairing: I was there. What is attested to is indivis-
ibly the reality of the past thing and the presence of the narrator at the place of its occur-
rence. And it is the witness who first declares himself to be a witness. . . . These . . . as-
sertions link point-like testimony to the whole history of a life. 
(citation omitted). 
 173. See id. 
 174. Indeed, the jury instructions in Wisconsin would explicitly invite this sort of reasoning on 
the jury’s part. See, e.g., WIS. JI–CRIMINAL § 300, at 1 (2003): 
It is the duty of the jury to scrutinize and to weigh the testimony of witnesses and to de-
termine the effect of the evidence as a whole. You are the sole judges of the credibility, 
that is, the believability, of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. 
 
In determining the credibility of each witness and the weight you give to the testimony 
of each witness, consider these factors: 
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mony comes through the mouth of a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, 
the jury attaches unwarranted credibility to the claims made.175 This is 
not to say that the jury is necessarily persuaded by mental health profes-
sionals or police officers, but still, the defendant’s words seem less self-
interested when audible in their voices rather than his own.  
The effects of the gap between Dahmer and those who recounted his 
statements are seen in cross examination. The prosecutors typically ad-
dressed not the internal consistency of Dahmer’s statements, but the pru-
dential judgments made by the clinician in light of the evidence.176 By 
encasing Dahmer’s statements within sworn testimony of medical pro-
fessionals, the defense largely insulated the substance of Dahmer’s 
statements from challenge. Although the jury might have questioned the 
clinical witnesses’ conclusions, it did not consider directly the truthful-
ness of Dahmer’s self-report.177 
The failure to interrogate Dahmer’s statements for truthfulness is 
not insubstantial. The defense repeatedly asserted that it was being trans-
  
• whether the witness has an interest or lack of interest in the result of this trial; 
• the witness’ conduct, appearance, and demeanor on the witness stand; 
• the clearness or lack of clearness of the witness’ recollections; 
. . . . 
• bias or prejudice, if any has been shown; 
• possible motives for falsifying testimony; and 
• all other facts and circumstances during the trial which tend either to support or to 
discredit the testimony. 
 175. RICOEUR, supra note 6, at 164: 
It is before someone that the witness testifies to the reality of some scene of which he was 
part of the audience, perhaps as actor or victim, yet, in the moment of testifying, he is in 
the position of a third-person observer with regard to all the protagonists of the action. 
This dialogical structure immediately makes clear the dimension of trust involved: the 
witness asks to be believed. He does not limit himself to saying “I was there,” he adds 
“believe me.” Certification of the testimony then is not complete except through the echo 
response of the one who receives the testimony and accepts it. Then the testimony is not 
just certified, it is accredited. . . . In this case, the accreditation comes down to authenti-
cating the witness on personal terms. The result is what we call his trustworthiness, 
whose evaluation can be assimilated to comparative orders of magnitude. 
(citation omitted). 
 176. Id. at 164–65: 
The possibility of suspicion in turn opens a space of controversy within which several 
testimonies and several witnesses find themselves confronted with one another. . . . The 
witness anticipates these circumstances in a way by adding a third clause to his declara-
tion: “I was there,” he says, “believe me,” to which he adds, “If you don’t believe me, ask 
someone else,” said almost like a challenge. The witness is thus the one who accepts be-
ing questioned and expected to answer what may turn out to be a criticism of what he 
says. 
 177. The testimony of the court’s own psychiatric expert, Dr. George Palermo, addresses this 
very issue. See David Doege, Anger in His Homosexuality Led Dahmer to Kill, Psychiatrist Says, 
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 1992, at 1: 
Dahmer has lied for years and still lies today.  
 
“He lied to the judge in 1989 (when Dahmer was sentenced for sexual assault),” Paler-
mo said. “He lied to his lawyer.”  
 
“He lied to many doctors to get the (sleeping) pills. It is my feeling he has embellished a 
great deal in the things he has said he did.” 
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parent, when it was actually casting significant parts of the story into the 
shadows.178 For example, woven into the testimony of the psychiatrists 
was an unstated assumption that Dahmer’s statements were at all times 
internally consistent; that he should be believed because he unburdened 
himself completely and uniformly. The evidence does not support that 
assertion.179 
Indeed, there are wide factual disparities, both large and small, in 
Dahmer’s recounting of the murder of Stephen Hicks, the first murder he 
admitted committing. In his initial statement, Dahmer relates that he and 
Hicks had sex at his home and later fought, and Hicks died, almost by 
accident, when Dahmer struck him in the head with a barbell.180 The sto-
ry develops over time. When he next describes the Hicks homicide, he 
states that Hicks was not a homosexual, and they did not have sex and 
does not mention a fight.181 In a later statement, he underscores that he 
and Hicks did not engage in any homosexual activities before or after 
Hicks’s death.182 When talking with one of the examining psychiatrists, 
Dahmer related that he “[h]ad the idea to hit [Hicks] over the head for 
  
 178. RICOEUR, supra note 6, at 85 (“It is, more precisely, the selective function of the narrative 
that opens to manipulation the opportunity and the means of a clever strategy, consisting from the 
outset in a strategy of forgetting as much as in a strategy of remembering.”). 
 179. Id. at 316–17: 
To be sure, applying the criteria of concordance and relying upon independent verifica-
tion of the confession provide perfect illustrations of the theses offered . . . on the “evi-
dentiary paradigm”: the same complementarity between the oral nature of testimony and 
the material nature of the evidence authenticated by expert testimony; the same relevance 
of “small errors,” the probable sign of inauthenticity; the same primacy accorded to ques-
tioning, to playing with possibilities in imagination; the same perspicacity in uncovering 
contradictions, incoherencies, unlikelihoods; the same attention to silences, to voluntary 
or involuntary omissions; the same familiarity, finally, with the resources for falsifying 
language in terms of error, lying, self-delusion, deception. 
 180. Patrick Kennedy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 9–10 (July 23, 
1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author): 
Subject [Jeffrey Dahmer] states that when he was 18 years of age and living in Richfield, 
Ohio, he picked up a hitchhiker whom he described as a white male about 19 years of 
age. He states he took him home and had homosexual sex with him and states they were 
drinking beer and became intoxicated. He states they got into a physical fight because the 
19-year old individual tried to leave and that during the fight, he states he struck the hit-
chhiker with a barbel [sic]. He states that the blow of the barbel [sic] caused the death of 
the hitchhiker, and at this time he took the body out into a wooded area by his house and 
left it there to decompose for about two weeks. 
 181. Dennis Murphy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 23 (July 24, 1991) 
(unpublished police report, on file with author): 
He states his first homicide which occurred, he believes around October of 1978, was of a 
white male hitchhiker, whom he describes as 18-yoa., 5'10'' tall, skinny build, maybe 150 
lbs., having straight brown collar length hair, not wearing glasses, clean shaven, and he 
believes he was not a homosexual. He states he didn’t have sex with this individual, he 
just invited him in for a drink, and when the individual wanted to leave that’s when he hit 
him with a “barbell” and subsequently disposed of the body behind his residence. He 
states he did burn his clothes and identification. 
 182. R.W. Munsey, Statement of Jeffrey L. Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 12, at 488 (Aug. 8, 
1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author) (“Jeffrey L. Dahmer was interviewed regard-
ing whether he engaged in any homosexual activities with Steven M. Hicks before or after his death. 
Jeffrey L. Dahmer stated there were ‘no’ homosexual activities.”). 
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about a half hour.”183 He then strangled him with a barbell, explaining, “I 
didn’t want to get caught so I went all the way and finished it (strangled 
him).”184 The day after the murder, Dahmer continued, he masturbated in 
front of the body and touched the body in the chest and penis area, but 
did not have oral sex.185 The following day he bought a hunting knife, 
masturbated again, cut him open to view his insides, and then dismem-
bered the body “to make him light enough to carry.”186 In a later inter-
view with a different psychiatrist, Dahmer claims he opened Hicks’s 
belly and masturbated over that and later cut his head off, cleaned it off 
under the sink, and masturbated in front of that.187 
Had Dahmer testified at trial, each of these inconsistencies would 
have been laid out in detail before the jury to cast doubt on his veracity. 
Because the evidence came in through clinicians and detectives though, 
this line of cross examination was never developed. Therefore, the con-
tradictions within Dahmer’s statements were largely ignored, except for 
Dr. Palermo’s assertion that Dahmer “embellished” much of what he 
claimed to have done,188 and the jury was given the impression that 
Dahmer was basically truthful.  
It is noteworthy that Jeffrey Dahmer’s statements describing the 
Hicks murder grew more bizarre and disturbing as the trial date ap-
proached. By this time, Dahmer had likely internalized a desire to be 
found psychologically ill rather than wicked. Because Dahmer’s state-
ments furnish the sole source of information given to the jury, his mo-
tives to testify falsely at trial needed to be fully explored. In his varying 
renditions of the Hicks murder, Dahmer may have reflexively shaded the 
truth to appear more psychologically ill than he was.  
The ostensible internal consistency of Dahmer’s statements pro-
jected by the defense echoes a coordinated assertion that Dahmer’s ac-
tions in the fifteen charged murders were similar. Rather than breaking 
down each murder to explore their unique circumstances, the defense 
implied that Dahmer’s killings were locked in a repeating loop. Although 
the defense addressed the specifics of the uncharged Hicks and Tuomi 
murders, the fifteen charged offenses were grouped as an indistinguisha-
  
 183. Frederick A. Fosdal, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination 13 (Oct. 23, 1991) 
(unpublished report, on file with author). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 14. 
 187. Park Elliott Dietz, Interview Notes for Jeffrey Dahmer Examination, at A81–A82 (Jan. 5, 
1992) (unpublished report, on file with author). 
 188. See, e.g., Jim Stingl, Dahmer Needs Help but Is Sane, Court Told, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 6, 
1992, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted): 
[Dr.] Palermo called Dahmer a manipulator and said he doubted Dahmer’s claim that he 
planned to build a temple out of the bones of his victims. 
. . . . 
He also doubted whether Dahmer actually ate the flesh of any of his victims. Dahmer 
“embellished” the facts and made them more ugly than they already were, he said. 
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ble whole by Dahmer’s attorneys and expert witnesses.189 For example, 
Dr. Fred Berlin of the Johns Hopkins Medical School focused on the 
process of differential diagnosis in reaching his conclusion that the de-
fendant suffered from a mental disease, rather than highlighting facts of 
the crimes related by the defendant.190 After describing Dahmer’s disap-
pointment and hopelessness following the death of Steven Tuomi, Berlin 
concluded that “Mr. Dahmer was out of control. . . . It wasn’t going to be 
he who was going to stop it. It was going to have to be an outside 
force.”191 Dr. Berlin barely mentioned the name of any of Dahmer’s oth-
er victims on direct examination.192  
Similarly, Dr. Judith Becker developed a narrative regarding Dah-
mer’s developmental psychology. She brought out childhood memories 
and tried to tie them to his later actions.193 She testified that Dahmer was 
eventually so “consumed” by the mental disease of necrophilia that his 
obsession led him to kill uncontrollably.194 Becker’s testimony revealed 
some differences from Dahmer’s statement to the police; he stated to her 
that he had sex with every victim’s body after death.195 Becker also dis-
cussed specifics of the murders themselves, including a new revelation 
  
 189. Videotape: State of Wisconsin v. Jeffrey Dahmer Tape One, at 46:10 (Jan. 30, 1992) (on 
file with the Marquette University Law Library). In his opening statement, Dahmer’s attorney 
pointed out that, in the opinion of his three expert witnesses, after Dahmer’s killing of Steven Tuomi 
in the Ambassador Hotel in Milwaukee, “It was all over. Mr. Dahmer would continue to do this until 
it was stopped.” Id. 
 190. Videotape: State of Wisconsin v. Jeffrey Dahmer Tape Three, at 2:59:45 (Feb. 3, 1992) 
(on file with the Marquette University Law Library). Dr. Berlin described psychiatric illness as 
embodying a value judgment. Id. He stated that there is a diversity of bodily conditions and posed 
the following argument: In physical medicine, consider two different sorts of conditions or 
processes. One is called cancer, the other is called respiration or breathing. We don’t like cancer. It 
causes suffering; therefore, we call it a disease. Similarly, there are different sexual attractions. Some 
people are heterosexually attracted; others are attracted to persons of the same gender. At one point, 
psychiatry thought that homosexuality was a disease. It no longer does. Dahmer’s case is different. 
He has intense, recurrent sexual fantasies of dead bodies. Id.; see also Testimony from the Dahmer 
Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 1992, at 6 (“If this isn’t mental illness, from my point of view, 
I don’t know what is.”). 
 191. David Doege, Doctor: Dahmer ‘Out of Control’ Testifies on Killer’s Fantasies, 
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 4, 1992, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 192. See id. On cross examination, the prosecutor elicited that Dr. Berlin spent only four hours 
and forty-five minutes total with Dahmer in reaching his diagnosis, less than half the time spent by 
any other expert witness. See id. This information may have diminished Dr. Berlin’s effectiveness in 
the jury’s eyes. 
 193. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1992, at 7: 
At age 8 . . . he recalled his father . . . fished in the pond . . . . 
 
. . . . When he talked of cutting the fish open and seeing the inside of the fish, he became 
somewhat more animated, somewhat more alive in a sense. 
 
Knowing what he had done to his victims and cutting them open and knowing that he 
had appeared to be fascinated by the viscera, by the insides of his victims, I wonder if 
that early incident of the cutting open and the fascination with colors was not somehow 
related to what happened later on. 
(first and second omission in original). 
 194. Doege, supra note 41, at 1. 
 195. Id. 
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that he had intercourse with the internal organs of his victims.196 She also 
discussed other gruesome aspects of the case such as the cannibalism of 
Ernest Miller and Errol Lindsey.197 That said, Dahmer’s careful planning 
and efforts to avoid capture were absent from her testimony.198 Dr. Beck-
er’s testimony was an interpretation of Dahmer’s actions from a psycho-
logical model rather than a description of his actions; she wove a narra-
tive of what might have been going on in Dahmer’s mind rather than 
describing the whole of what he did.199 Her failure to wrestle with Dah-
mer’s actions led her to minimize obvious aspects such as the need to 
dispose of bodies before they started rotting. Dr. Becker also spent a 
great deal of time explaining Dahmer’s current suicidal ideation and his 
plans for a bone shrine he never built.200 
Dr. Becker’s fascination with the psychological narrative is demon-
strated by her willingness to accept Dahmer’s description of his proposed 
“temple of bones,” which did not match up with the physical evidence in 
the case. Dahmer sketched for her a diagram of what the “temple” would 
look like.201 It would be built around a black lacquered table that would 
have two skeletons on either side of a desk resting at hip height, and 
there would be skulls he collected on the table looking back at him.202 He 
claimed he had already purchased the table.203 The difficulty emerges 
when one considers the physical evidence. The only table Dahmer owned 
was a black coffee table about 15 to 18 inches tall and approximately 
four feet long; it appeared in some of the photos of his victims. None of 
the skeletons he collected could rest on it at hip height because it was not 
tall enough. Further, the skulls could not be stacked in the ways he 
claimed because the surface was too small to hold them. Dr. Becker 
simply failed to check Dahmer’s claims against evidence on police in-
ventory.204 Similarly, a third clinician, Dr. Wahlstrom, focused on Dah-
  
 196. Jim Stingl, Several Disorders Played Role: Expert Dahmer Was Psychotic, Witness Testi-
fies, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 5, 1992, at 1. There is no evidence that Dahmer mentioned this act of 
masturbating with internal organs to any other witness. Indeed, it is quite clear he did not say this to 
either Dr. Fosdal or Dr. Dietz. Both of them spoke with the defendant after Dr. Becker’s interview. I 
find it difficult to account for Dahmer’s failure to mention this particular paraphilia to other wit-
nesses when he had admitted so much already. 
 197. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, supra note 193, at 7. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Dr. Becker acted as an excellent psychologist in trying to describe Dahmer’s mental 
processes. However, her analysis is not how the law looks at intent. As James Fitzjames Stephen 
points out, “The only possible way of discovering a man’s intention is by looking at what he actually 
did, and by considering what must have appeared to him at the time the natural consequence of his 
conduct.” STEPHEN, supra note 59, at 111. By foregrounding the psychological history, Dr. Becker 
de-emphasized the physical facts of the case. 
 200. See Doege, supra note 41, at 1. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See Stingl, supra note 196, at 1. 
 203. See id. (“Dahmer said the temple, to be built on a black table in his West Side apartment, 
would be a ‘power center.’”). 
 204. Indeed, the court-appointed expert, Dr. George Palermo, “doubted Dahmer’s claim that he 
planned to build a temple out of the bones of his victims.” Stingl, supra note 188, at 1. It may have 
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mer’s delusions regarding his possible temple of bones.205 Wahlstrom’s 
testimony in particular dwelt on Dahmer’s performance on a battery of 
psychological tests.206 However, his testimony, like that of Drs. Berlin 
and Becker, did not delve much into the particulars of the crimes them-
selves.207 In the final analysis, his opinions seemed based largely on 
broad abstractions, and he therefore failed to provide the jury with con-
crete evidence to refute the state’s case.  
Dahmer’s failure to testify impeded another possible line of ques-
tioning: had Dahmer spoken under oath, the prosecution could have de-
veloped how he enticed men to come home with him. In the case-in-
chief, Dahmer rendered these encounters as largely financial.208 What if 
this report was another of Dahmer’s manipulations? It may be that one of 
the most important ways Dahmer showed control was in his ability to 
appear attractive, friendly, and a safe person with whom to go home. 
Because he did not discuss these matters with the detectives or expert 
witnesses, the jury could not reflect on this aspect of his personality. 
From one perspective, his silence in the courtroom may have been that of 
a puppeteer: he provided the words to the witnesses that he could not say 
himself. By insulating himself from questions that would shatter his 
claim of illness, he may have been manipulating the defense witnesses 
just as he manipulated his victims. 
At the end of the defense case-in-chief, the jury had a description of 
a disturbed figure who did horrifying things. Surely that is one aspect of 
Jeffrey Dahmer. However, he was much more. The image crafted by the 
defense failed to account for how Dahmer could hold a job or persuade 
his victims to return to his apartment with him. The defense focused the 
jury on the bizarre and delusional, asking it to return a verdict based on 
these disjointed episodes in the life of the silent man surrounded by his 
attorneys at counsel table. It was not clear at the end of the defense’s 
case how someone as disturbed as the Jeffrey Dahmer they had presented 
managed to function undetected for years.  
VII. MEETING THE CHALLENGES: REFRAMING A MADMAN AS A 
CONSUMMATE PLANNER  
To counter the discursive image of a madman suggested by the de-
fense, the prosecution filled in the picture of the defendant, showing that 
  
stemmed from the failure of Dahmer’s story to match up with the physical evidence, but the record 
does not address that point. 
 205. Stingl, supra note 196, at 1 (“Carl M. Wahlstrom Jr., who became a psychiatrist two years 
ago and works in Chicago, said he believed Dahmer was psychotic because of his plans to erect a 
temple where he would display the skulls and bones of his victims.”). 
 206. See Carl M. Wahlstrom, Jr., Report of Psychiatric Evaluation of Jeffrey Dahmer 9–10 
(Jan. 9, 1992) (unpublished court file, on file with author). 
 207. In an eleven-page report, brief descriptions of the crimes themselves appear in only four 
paragraphs. See id. at 6–7. 
 208. See, e.g., Murphy & Kennedy, supra note 29, at 88. 
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he was at all times in control of his actions. As a segue into the prosecu-
tion’s case-in-chief, the court’s witness, Dr. George Palermo, maintained 
that Jeffrey Dahmer was responsible for his actions under the law.209 
Palermo described Dahmer as making conscious choices “at the moment 
of the killings, in the preparation of the killing and afterwards.”210 Paler-
mo anticipated the prosecution’s strategy by stating “Jeffrey Dahmer is a 
human being . . . . To take [that] away from him by just saying he is a 
necrophile is wrong . . . . He is much more.”211 He continued, “Jeffrey 
Dahmer knew exactly what he was doing . . . he had taken precautions, 
very, very good ones. He knew the consequences of his action but he did 
not want to stop.”212 
The prosecution took as its theme Dahmer’s desire to control and 
his ability to choose, and it reframed earlier testimony in the case as indi-
cating careful planning on Dahmer’s part.213 Initially, the prosecution 
needed to normalize Jeffrey Dahmer, to provide a context, by showing 
that his life fit together coherently; he struck others as friendly, unre-
markable, and sane.214 Beginning with the cross-examination of Detec-
tive Dennis Murphy, the prosecution asked every witness who had exten-
  
 209. Stingl, supra note 188, at 1: 
Palermo said that like most people, he expected to come face-to-face with a “crazy” per-
son the first time he met with Dahmer, because of the number of people Dahmer had 
killed.  
 
“I was shocked when I met him,” Palermo said. “I knew after four hours that he was not 
psychotic.”  
 
Palermo said Dahmer’s speech was clear and his answers were coherent. He found 
Dahmer amiable and intelligent . . . . “He’s a likable fellow.” 
 210. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 211. Doege, supra note 177, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 212. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 1992, at 7 (alteration in 
original). 
 213. See, e.g., Jim Stingl, Urge to Kill Ruled: Expert, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 3, 1992, at 1. As 
Detective Murphy noted: 
Dahmer felt a sense of power knowing his family, neighbors and even police officers 
couldn’t detect his secret world of killing. “He took pleasure in the fact of knowing that 
he had a private world of his own that no one else knew about,” Murphy said. “He felt he 
had this ability to make people see a phase of him that only he wished them to see, and 
this encouraged him to continue on with his crimes, feeling that he would never be 
caught,” Murphy said. 
Id. 
 214. Under Duthey v. State, the jury is permitted to rely on the opinions of laypersons who are 
familiar with the defendant about his sanity or lack thereof. 111 N.W. 222, 226 (Wis. 1907). The 
substance of this common law decision is encased in the Federal Rules of Evidence on opinion 
testimony by lay witnesses: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions 
or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimo-
ny or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.  
FED. R. EVID. 701. The witness has to have first-hand knowledge, and this knowledge must be of the 
sort that will help the jury resolve a disputed fact. This was the foundation that the prosecution used 
in introducing testimony from Dahmer’s co-workers, apartment manager, police officers, and poten-
tial victims who testified as to Dahmer’s apparent sanity. 
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sive contact with Jeffrey Dahmer the same set of questions. After estab-
lishing that the witness had spent an appreciable amount of time with 
Dahmer, the examiner would ask if Dahmer displayed hallucinations, 
delusions, unconnected thoughts, incoherent responses, or appeared not 
to be tracking the conversation.215 In this manner, the prosecution built 
up a weight of evidence from ordinary people who encountered the de-
fendant in various times and places, and who saw him as perfectly nor-
mal and unremarkable.  
For example, his former boss at the Ambrosia Chocolate Company 
testified that he had no problems with Dahmer, whom he described as 
“polite.”216 “He was quiet. He had no problems reacting with others.”217 
Further, his boss thought Dahmer did “a satisfactory job.”218 One of the 
facts that came out at trial was that Dahmer was able to mix almost five 
hundred distinct chocolate recipes during his time there, indicating his 
ability to perform and be paid for complex tasks. Dahmer’s apartment 
manager thought Dahmer was “a very nice guy,” and he was willing to 
ask Dahmer to become his business partner.219 His building manager 
further described Dahmer’s apartment as “probably the neatest apartment 
I’ve seen.”220 This line of questioning helped the jury see Dahmer as he 
was seen by coworkers and other ordinary people. He did not strike ac-
quaintances as out of touch with reality. 
A second sort of lay witness helped the jury focus on Dahmer’s 
mental state at or near the time of his attempted or completed murders. 
The prosecution called citizen witnesses and police officers, whom had 
observed Dahmer near these times, to testify to his apparent rationality 
and control. A friend of Dahmer’s fifth victim, Anthony Sears, explained 
he dropped Dahmer and Sears off near Dahmer’s grandmother’s home on 
the last night he saw his friend.221 “I felt that [Dahmer] was a very nice 
person. He seemed very kind.”222 Another witness, Ronald Flowers, had 
difficulties starting his car, so Dahmer offered to take him to his grand-
  
 215. See, e.g., Videotape: State of Wisconsin v. Jeffrey Dahmer Tape Three, at 48:20 (Feb. 3, 
1992) (on file with the Marquette University Law Library). Detective Dennis Murphy denied on 
cross examination that Dahmer displayed any evidence of mental illness during the approximately 
sixty hours of interviews he had with him. Id. He further indicated that Dahmer was able to describe 
in detail the extent of his planning, the lengths he went to in eliminating the evidence, and that he 
felt he had the ability to make people see only what he wanted. Id. 
 216. David Doege, Dahmer’s Work OK, Bosses Say, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 1992, at 
1. 
 217. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 218. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 219. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 12, 1992, at 8. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Jim Stingl, Dahmer Is Sane, Psychiatrist Says, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 8, 1992, at 1. 
 222. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This observation goes to Dahmer’s ability to be 
manipulative. He could be charming and attractive to other men, a fact largely unexplored during 
trial. 
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mother’s home to pick up jumper cables.223 After the cab dropped them 
off near Dahmer’s address, Flowers testified that he was suspicious and 
warned Dahmer he only wanted to get his car started.224 Flowers came 
inside the home reluctantly, and Dahmer said that he was tired and 
needed some coffee. Flowers agreed and passed out soon after drinking 
the coffee mixed with Halcion that Dahmer had prepared for him.225 The 
next thing Flowers remembered was awaking in a hospital room.226 
Flowers stated that he encountered Dahmer a year later in a bar; Dahmer 
said to him, “I really don’t remember who you are . . . maybe we can go 
have a cup of coffee.”227 
On May 27, 1991, Jeffrey Dahmer lured a young Laotian man, Ko-
nerak Sinthasomphone, back to his apartment. He claimed to have 
drugged him, drilled a hole in his skull, and injected him with a dose of 
muriatic acid and water.228 Before killing him, Dahmer decided he 
needed more beer before he could go through with killing and disposal, 
and he left the young man in his apartment.229 As he returned to his 
apartment after having a drink, he saw Sinthasomphone sitting nude on 
the curb.230 Dahmer was taking him back to his apartment when both the 
police and fire departments showed up.231 Dahmer reports that he told the 
police that his friend always acted like this when he got drunk and did 
not speak English.232 The police officers who spoke with Dahmer during 
this incident testified that he “responded in a calm, clear voice.”233 Dah-
mer related that the youth was his friend who had drunk too much and 
passed out on the couch.234 Dahmer spoke coherently and did not appear 
to be drunk.235 He spoke with the officers about how bad crime was in 
the neighborhood, and brought them into his apartment they described as 
“well-kept” and “neat.”236 The officers found Polaroid photos of Sintha-
somphone in the apartment, which they saw as confirming Dahmer’s 
story. They left Dahmer with what soon became his thirteenth victim. 
Dahmer would later state that after the police left, he gave Sinthasom-
phone another shot of muriatic acid and killed him.237 Furthermore, 
  
 223. David Doege, Those Who Got Away Recall Dahmer ‘Why Is He Looking at Me Like 
That?’ Victim Asked, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 1992, at 1. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 228. Fosdal, supra note 34, at 45. 
 229. See Dennis Murphy, Statement of Jeffrey Dahmer, Case No. 2472 § 5, at 117 (Aug. 2, 
1991) (unpublished police report, on file with author). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. David Doege, Officers Recall Dahmer, Youth, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 12, 1992, at 1 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 237. Fosdal, supra note 34, at 46. 
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Dahmer later told police that the body of another victim, Tony Hughes, 
was on the floor of his bedroom at that time.238 This evidence unders-
cored Dahmer’s control of an extraordinarily stressful situation within an 
hour of committing a murder. It undermines the defense’s claim that he 
was beset by unchecked passion. 
The prosecution’s expert witnesses largely corroborated the impres-
sions of the lay witnesses that Dahmer could control his actions at all 
times. Echoing Freud’s observation quoted above, Dr. Frederick Fosdal 
testified that he had never seen a sexual disorder that rendered someone 
unable to follow the law.239 Although Dahmer enjoyed the sex with a 
compliant partner, he did not enjoy the killing,240 and actually let some 
folks go because he didn’t have the energy to kill when he had a hangov-
er.241 He found killing difficult unless he was somewhat drunk.242 Under 
Fosdal’s analysis, the desire for sex was separated from the unpleasant 
task of killing and the administrative details of disposing of the 
corpses.243 Fosdal further undercut Dahmer’s claim of uncontrollable 
passion by eliciting that Dahmer would only approach men who did not 
have cars so they would not leave evidence outside his apartment.244 
The theme of the final prosecution witness, Dr. Park Elliott Dietz, 
was that none of Dahmer’s acts were impulsive. Rather, each charged 
  
 238. See David E. Umhoefer, Police Were in Dahmer Flat, MILWAUKEE J., Aug. 1, 1991, at 1. 
 239. Jim Stingl, Disorder Alone Is Not Insanity, Expert Testifies, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 10, 
1992, at 1. 
 240. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 1992, at 8: 
E. Michael McCann, district attorney: Did the defendant at any time say to you that he 
enjoyed the killing? 
Fosdal: Repeatedly he denied that. I think that is established. 
 
McCann: Did he say anything about taking pleasure from the killing? 
Fosdal: He repeatedly denied that. 
. . . .  
McCann: So the pleasure was the sex before and after, but he did not have that powerful . 
. . motive, a desire for the killing? 
Fosdal: That was an unwanted step. 
(second alteration in original). 
 241. Fosdal, supra note 28, at 25. 
 242. Testimony from the Dahmer Trial, supra note 240, at 8. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Fosdal, supra note 30, at 59: 
Q: You and a guy go home together in a car—[h]e gives you a ride home and then he’s 
done with and then his car is parked down in the street. 
A: That wouldn’t have worked. 
 
Q: Was that an issue? 
A: Yeah—if they had a car, then I wouldn’t ask them back. 
 
Q: You meet the guy at the tavern, and he says I have a car. 
A: Then I wouldn’t have pursued it any further. 
. . . . 
A: They would have parked the car near the house and that wouldn’t have worked—
[t]hey could have been traced. 
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killing was “a planned and deliberate act.”245 Dahmer would grind sleep-
ing pills before he went out to find a victim so they would be ready to 
mix in a drink.246 He was able to be charming, seductive, and lure people 
back to his apartment. He would kill only on weekends so he could spend 
more time with the bodies and not have to go to work.247 He only killed 
in his own apartment where he could control who could come in so that 
he would not be bothered.248 Dahmer also related to Dietz that he knew 
right from wrong every time he killed, and he could have stopped him-
self from killing had someone walked in on him just before he committed 
the act.249 Dahmer also said that if he could have “obtained the company 
of these men and had sexual contact with them with less drastic means, 
he would have stopped” killing.250 
Perhaps the most telling testimony was Dietz’s report that Dahmer 
explained he had always used a condom when engaging in sex with a 
corpse or unconscious person to avoid contracting AIDS or other diseas-
es.251 “The intensity of his sexual urge at that point was less than that 
many teenagers experience in the back seat with their girlfriend,” Dietz 
testified.252 This observation destroyed Dahmer’s claim of unbridled and 
uncontrollable passion. 
Dietz also drew out that necrophilia was not Dahmer’s primary at-
traction.253 Dahmer’s first desire was for an attractive sexual partner who 
would be under his complete control and never leave him.254 His prefe-
rence would have been for an enduring relationship with an attractive 
living person, but he never found someone who fit these criteria, so he 
“settle[d] for less attractive, paraphilic alternatives.”255 His second choice 
would be a “zombie” sexual partner who would be alive indefinitely but 
would be lacking in will and therefore submit to his wishes.256 Dietz ob-
served that this fantasy is not uncommon and is played out in horror 
films with science fiction plots such as The Stepford Wives.257 Dahmer’s 
next choice would be an unconscious sexual partner.258 This sort of ob-
ject also appears in Western cultures in the fairy tale Sleeping Beauty.259 
Only if these choices were unavailable would Dahmer begin to fantasize 
  
 245. Jim Stingl, Dahmer Knew What He Was Doing, Expert Says, MILWALKEE J., Feb. 12, 
1992, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 251. Jim Stingl, Prosecution Expert Doesn’t Budge, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 13, 1992, at 1. 
 252. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 253. Dietz, supra note 23, at 2. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
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about a freeze-dried body or freshly dead corpse of an attractive man.260 
Despite these unorthodox sexual longings, Dietz concluded that Dahmer 
was able to function well in society and did not meet the criteria of any 
of the recognized patterns of personality disorder.261 
CONCLUSION 
Given the jury’s task of constructing a master narrative, weaving 
together the disparate strands of testimony to create a coherent picture, it 
is perhaps understandable that the jury rejected Dahmer’s claim of insan-
ity.262 There were too many logical gaps in a context too unfinished to 
account for all the evidence of his complex life. The defense did not give 
the jury a way of connecting the uncontrollable necrophile they portrayed 
with a person who functioned rationally both at work and in his other 
human interactions. The defense’s case seemed pretextual because the 
facts they elicited appeared incomplete in light of the broader context 
revealed by Dahmer’s own statements and actions.  
Ultimately, Dahmer’s silence, which made his killings possible, 
may have led to his downfall in court. Soren Kierkegaard’s Fear and 
Trembling begins with a series of meditations on the Biblical patriarch 
Abraham’s failure to speak as he was taking his son Isaac up Mount Mo-
riah.263 By remaining silent, by not informing Isaac that he was told to 
sacrifice him, Kierkegaard maintains Abraham failed to act ethically.264 
Derrida observes in his commentary on Kierkegaard, “[Abraham] speaks 
and doesn’t speak. . . . He speaks in order not to say anything about the 
essential thing that he must keep secret.”265 
Isn’t this what Dahmer does both on the street and in the cour-
troom? He does not tell those whom he is seducing that they are potential 
prey, that he is willing to kill them if they refuse to follow his every 
whim. By strangling them, he silences their voices so they cannot be 
witnesses against him. He does not respond to “missing” advertisements 
he sees in the papers. Then, in the courtroom, he mutes his own voice so 
the jury cannot observe his self-interested and manipulative behavior 
first hand; rather, he is audible only in the voices to which he has chosen 
to describe his past, a narrative that he may well have constructed for his 
own purposes. While clothing himself in the guise of a Romeo or Juliet, 
  
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 6. 
 262. RICOEUR, supra note 163, at 178. 
 263. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH 26–77 
(Walter Lowrie trans., Princeton Univ. Press 3d ed. 1968) (1843 & 1849). 
 264. Id. at 67; DERRIDA, supra note 2, at 60. 
 265. DERRIDA, supra note 2, at 60. 
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a lover willing to give of self for the other, he in fact used the other for 
his own selfish purposes.266 
Ultimately, the weight of the testimony—the text generated at tri-
al—persuaded the jury that the silent defendant’s proposed history of 
events was incomplete. The interpretation of the past he proffered was 
riddled with gaps and inconsistencies that could not be reconciled with 
his actions, his previous statements, and the observations of others. Un-
like his trusting victims, the jury refused to be moved by the defendant’s 
silence. They found the context proposed by the prosecution more com-
pelling, and rather than accepting the defendant’s muteness, they spoke 
in his place. 
 
  
 266. See Stingl, supra note 213, at 1 (according to Detective Murphy, Dahmer claimed he 
killed “[f]or his own warped selfish desire for self-gratification” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
